IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v19y2002i4p773-790.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations

Author

Listed:
  • Yan Chen

    () (Department of Economics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220, USA)

Abstract

We present a family of mechanisms which implement Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium. With quasilinear utility functions this family of mechanisms are supermodular games, which implies that they converge to Nash equilibrium under a wide class of learning dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Yan Chen, 2002. "A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(4), pages 773-790.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:19:y:2002:i:4:p:773-790
    Note: Received: April 27, 2000; revised version: January 16, 2001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/2019004/20190773.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Van Essen, Matthew & Lazzati, Natalia & Walker, Mark, 2012. "Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 366-381.
    2. Nigar Hashimzade & Gareth D. Myles, 2009. "Announcement or Contribution? The Relative Efficiency of Manipulated Lindahl Mechanisms," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 565-598, August.
    3. Sébastien ROUILLON (GREThA UMR CNRS 5113), 2009. "A new mechanism to implement the Lindahl equilibriums (In French)," Cahiers du GREThA 2009-09, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.
    4. Nizar Allouch, 2013. "A competitive equilibrium for a warm-glow economy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 269-282, May.
    5. Matt Van Essen, 2015. "Bartering Games in the Kolm Triangle," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(3), pages 297-310, June.
    6. Matt Van Essen, 2012. "A note on the stability of Chen’s Lindahl mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(2), pages 365-370, February.
    7. Healy, Paul J. & Jain, Ritesh, 2017. "Generalized Groves–Ledyard mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 204-217.
    8. Mathevet, Laurent & Taneva, Ina, 2013. "Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 327-349.
    9. Charles Figuières & Marc Willinger, 2012. "Regulating ambient pollution when social costs are unknown," Working Papers 12-17, LAMETA, Universitiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.
    10. Van Essen, Matthew J., 2008. "A Simple Supermodular Mechanism that Implements Lindahl Allocations," MPRA Paper 12781, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Van Essen, Matthew & Walker, Mark, 2017. "A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 6-19.
    12. Korpela Ville, 2016. "Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry," Discussion Papers 108, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    13. Hassan Benchekroun & Charles Figuières & Mabel Tidball, 2016. "Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms," AMSE Working Papers 1637, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.
    14. Healy, Paul J. & Mathevet, Laurent, 2012. "Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    15. Matt Van Essen, 2012. "Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(1), pages 15-40, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public goods mechanisms; Supermodular games.;

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:19:y:2002:i:4:p:773-790. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.