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A reconsideration of multiple equilibria in the analysis of one-period government bonds with default risk

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  • Guo, Yanling

Abstract

In this paper, the author considers sovereign debt in the form of one-period government bonds with default risk, which can be purchased by and traded among domestic and foreign investors. She shows that the "good equilibrium" is the only stable equilibrium under some quite general assumptions, while the "bad equilibrium" is an unstable one - a possible explanation for why the former is observed in practice. Given the "good equilibrium", the author further shows that the domestic debt share also determines the default risk: a higher domestic debt share means a lower default risk, ceteris paribus, which leads to a lower risk premium; while a lower domestic debt share means a higher default risk and a higher risk premium. Finally, she discusses some alternative interpretations of the domestic debt share.

Suggested Citation

  • Guo, Yanling, 2015. "A reconsideration of multiple equilibria in the analysis of one-period government bonds with default risk," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 9, pages 1-52.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifweej:201533
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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2015-33
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    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/121392/1/837705665.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, 2009. "The Costs of Sovereign Default," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 56(4), pages 683-741, November.
    2. Fernando Broner & Alberto Martin & Jaume Ventura, 2010. "Sovereign Risk and Secondary Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1523-1555, September.
    3. Nicola Gennaioli & Alberto Martin & Stefano Rossi, 2014. "Sovereign Default, Domestic Banks, and Financial Institutions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(2), pages 819-866, April.
    4. Landon, Stuart & Smith, Constance E., 2007. "Government debt spillovers in a monetary union," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 135-154, August.
    5. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 403-414.
    6. Schabert, Andreas, 2010. "Monetary policy under a fiscal theory of sovereign default," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 860-868, March.
    7. Cristina Arellano, 2008. "Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 690-712, June.
    8. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2011. "The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(552), pages 319-350, May.
    9. Cogan, John F. & Taylor, John B. & Wieland, Volker & Wolters, Maik H., 2013. "Fiscal consolidation strategy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 404-421.
    10. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    11. Engler, Philipp & Große Steffen, Christoph, 2016. "Sovereign risk, interbank freezes, and aggregate fluctuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 34-61.
    12. Aguiar, Mark & Gopinath, Gita, 2006. "Defaultable debt, interest rates and the current account," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 64-83, June.
    13. Borgy, V. & Laubach, T. & Mésonnier, J-S. & Renne, J-P., 2011. "Fiscal Sustainability, Default Risk and Euro Area Sovereign Bond Spreads Markets," Working papers 350, Banque de France.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public debt; sovereign debt; sovereign default; domestic debt; external debt; fiscal policy; government bond; government borrowing;

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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