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Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising

Author

Listed:
  • Ying Fan
  • Kai-Uwe Kühn
  • Francine Lafontaine

Abstract

Financial constraints are considered an important impediment to growth for small businesses. We study theoretically and empirically the relationship between the financial constraints of agents and the organizational decisions and growth of principals, in the context of franchising. We find that a 30 percent decrease in average collateralizable housing wealth in an area is associated with a delay in chains’ entry into franchising by 0.33 year on average, or 10 percent of the average waiting time, and a reduction in chain growth and hence a reduction in franchised chain employment of about 9 percent.

Suggested Citation

  • Ying Fan & Kai-Uwe Kühn & Francine Lafontaine, 2017. "Financial Constraints and Moral Hazard: The Case of Franchising," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(6), pages 2082-2125.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:doi:10.1086/694566
    DOI: 10.1086/694566
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    Cited by:

    1. Céline Bonnet & Jan Philip Schain, 2020. "An Empirical Analysis Of Mergers: Efficiency Gains And Impact On Consumer Prices," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-35.
    2. Rüdiger Bachmann & Sebastian K. Rüth, 2020. "Systematic Monetary Policy And The Macroeconomic Effects Of Shifts In Residential Loan‐To‐Value Ratios," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 61(2), pages 503-530, May.
    3. Sertsios, Giorgo, 2020. "Corporate finance, industrial organization, and organizational economics," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    4. Francine Lafontaine & Marek Zapletal & Xu Zhang, 2019. "Brighter prospects? Assessing the franchise advantage using census data," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 175-197, April.
    5. Renáta Kosová & Giorgo Sertsios, 2018. "An Empirical Analysis of Self-Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Hotel Franchising," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(1), pages 43-63, January.
    6. Hans K Hvide & Tom G Meling & Tarun Ramadorai, 2023. "Do Temporary Demand Shocks Have Long-Term Effects for Startups?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 36(1), pages 317-350.
    7. James Wang, 2020. "Screening soft information: evidence from loan officers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(4), pages 1287-1322, December.
    8. Philippe Cyrenne, 2016. "The Determinants of Dual Distribution Revisited," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 167-182, July.
    9. Chen Jiawei & Sacks Michael, 2018. "Going Along or Going Independent? A Dynamic Analysis of Nonprofit Alliances," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-20, April.
    10. Wei Lin & Frank Mathewson & Junji Xiao, 2024. "Screening Through Investment: Evidence from the Chinese Automobile Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 64(4), pages 471-513, June.
    11. Lømo, Teis Lunde, 2020. "Vertical control, opportunism, and risk sharing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L8 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services

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