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Grading System and Student Effort

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  • Valentina Paredes

    (Faculty of Economics and Business Universidad de Chile Santiago, Chile)

Abstract

Several papers have proposed that the grading system affects students’ incentives to exert effort. In particular, the previous literature has compared student effort under relative and absolute grading systems, but the results are mixed and the implications of the models have not been empirically tested. In this paper, I build a model where students maximize their utility by choosing effort. I investigate how student effort changes when there is a change in the grading system from absolute grading to relative grading. I use a unique dataset from college students in Chile who faced a change in the grading system to test the implications of my model. My model predicts that, for low levels of uncertainty, low-ability students exert less effort with absolute grading, and high-ability students exert more effort with absolute grading. The data confirm that there is a change in the distribution of effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Valentina Paredes, 2017. "Grading System and Student Effort," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 12(1), pages 107-128, Winter.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:edfpol:v:12:y:2017:i:1:p:107-128
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lewer, Joshua L. & Corbett, Colin & Marcum, Tanya M. & Highfill, Jannett, 2022. "Who Fills the Seats? Offering Extra Credit and Instructor Perceptions of Who Will Attend," Applied Economics Teaching Resources (AETR), Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 4(4), September.
    2. Czibor, Eszter & Onderstal, Sander & Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, C. Mirjam, 2020. "Does relative grading help male students? Evidence from a field experiment in the classroom," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    3. Joshua J. Lewer & Colin Corbett & Tanya M. Marcum & Jannett Highfill, 2021. "Modeling Student Effort: Flat Tires and Dead Batteries," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 66(2), pages 301-314, October.
    4. Mullins, Jamie T., 2018. "Motivating emissions cleanup: Absolute vs. relative performance standards," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 66-92.
    5. Martin Gregor, 2021. "Electives Shopping, Grading Policies and Grading Competition," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 88(350), pages 364-398, April.

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