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Mixing Bismarck and child pension systems: an optimum taxation approach

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  • Robert Fenge

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  • Jakob Weizsäcker

Abstract

The labor-leisure distortion of a pay-as-you-go pension system can be reduced through a stronger tax-benefit link or Bismarck pension system. Distortions of the fertility decision can be reduced through the introduction of a stronger child-benefit or child pension system. Within our optimal taxation framework, we find a Corlett-Hague result regarding the optimal mix of the two: if and only if children are more complementary to leisure should the taxbenefit link be given a positive weight at the expense of the child-benefit link. The model also allows us to examine the infertility insurance argument that may justify redistribution from families with children to those without implied by most pension systems. We find that the opposite redistribution, from the childless to those with children, would be efficient if individuals have low risk aversion. Redistribution in favor of the infertile would only be justified when risk aversion is high.
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Suggested Citation

  • Robert Fenge & Jakob Weizsäcker, 2010. "Mixing Bismarck and child pension systems: an optimum taxation approach," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 23(2), pages 805-823, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:23:y:2010:i:2:p:805-823
    DOI: 10.1007/s00148-008-0236-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Fenge & Beatrice Scheubel, 2017. "Pensions and fertility: back to the roots," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 30(1), pages 93-139, January.
    2. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2014. "Endogenous fertility, endogenous lifetime and economic growth: the role of child policies," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 529-564, April.
    3. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2012. "Fertility and PAYG pensions in the overlapping generations model," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 25(3), pages 955-961, July.
    4. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2013. "Fertility-related pensions and cyclical instability," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 26(3), pages 1209-1232, July.
    5. Luciano Fanti, 2012. "PAYG pensions and fertility drop: some (pleasant) arithmetic," Discussion Papers 2012/147, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    6. Vincenzo Galasso & Roberta Gatti & Paola Profeta, 2009. "Investing for the old age: pensions, children and savings," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 16(4), pages 538-559, August.
    7. Luca Spataro & Luciano Fanti, 2013. "From Malthusian to Modern fertility: When intergenerational transfers matter," Discussion Papers 2013/163, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
    8. Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca, 2012. "PAYG pensions, tax-cum-subsidy and A-Pareto efficiency," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 65-71.
    9. Filip Chybalski, 2016. "The Multidimensional Efficiency of Pension System: Definition and Measurement in Cross-Country Studies," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 15-34, August.
    10. Luca Spataro, Luciano Fanti and Pier Mario Pacini, 2017. "Savings, fertility and public policy in an OLG small open economy," Discussion Papers 2017/230, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Pay-as-you-go pension; Fertility; Optimal taxation; H23; H55; J13;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J18 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Public Policy

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