The best choice problem under ambiguity
We model and solve best choice problems in the multiple prior framework: An ambiguity averse decision maker aims to choose the best among a fixed number of applicants that appear sequentially in a random order. The agent faces ambiguity about the probability that a candidate—a relatively top applicant—is actually best among all applicants. We show that our model covers the classical secretary problem, but also other interesting classes of problems. We provide a closed form solution of the problem for time-consistent priors using backward induction. As in the classical case, the derived stopping strategy is simple. Ambiguity can lead to substantial differences to the classical threshold rule. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 54 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Larry G. Epstein & Martin Schneider, 2001.
RCER Working Papers
485, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2011.
"Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 313-339, October.
- Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David, 2008. "Are the Treasures of Game Theory Ambiguous?," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 08-08, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
- Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2008. "Are the Treasures of Game Theory Ambiguous?," Working Papers 0469, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2008.
- Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David, 2008. "Are the Treasures of Game Theory Ambiguous?," Papers 08-08, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
- Massimo Marinacci & Fabio Maccheroni & Alain Chateauneuf & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2003.
"Monotone Continuous Multiple Priors,"
ICER Working Papers - Applied Mathematics Series
30-2003, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Alain Chateauneuf & Fabio Macheronni & Massimo Marinacci & Jean-Marc Tallon, 2005. "Monotone continuous multiple priors," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00177057, HAL.
- Simone Cerreia-Vioglio & Paolo Ghirardato & Fabio Maccheroni & Massimo Marinacci & Marciano Siniscalchi, 2011.
"Rational preferences under ambiguity,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 341-375, October.
- Nishimura, Kiyohiko G. & Ozaki, Hiroyuki, 2007. "Irreversible investment and Knightian uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 668-694, September.
- Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1989.
"Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior,"
- Frank Riedel, 2009. "Optimal Stopping With Multiple Priors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(3), pages 857-908, 05.
- Alain Chateauneuf & Luciano De Castro, 2011. "Ambiguity Aversion and Absence of Trade," Discussion Papers 1535, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Larry Epstein & Martin Schneider, 2002.
"IID: Independently and Indistinguishably Distributed,"
RCER Working Papers
496, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Epstein, Larry G. & Schneider, Martin, 2003. "IID: independently and indistinguishably distributed," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 32-50, November.
- Luciano Castro & Alain Chateauneuf, 2011.
"Ambiguity aversion and trade,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 243-273, October.
- J. Neil Bearden & Amnon Rapoport & Ryan O. Murphy, 2006. "Sequential Observation and Selection with Rank-Dependent Payoffs: An Experimental Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(9), pages 1437-1449, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:54:y:2013:i:1:p:77-97. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.