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Effects of frames and incentives on prosociality in the lab. Comparing abstract and realistic scenarios

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  • Davide Barrera
  • Sara Romanò
  • Giulia Bocca

Abstract

This study presents two experiments investigating how frames and incentives – both monetary and non-monetary – affect prosocial behavior. In Experiment 1, the decision consisted of a one-shot dictator game and two factors were manipulated in a 2x3 factorial design: normative frame (present/absent) and incentives (none/monetary/nonmonetary). In Experiment 2, we manipulated the same two factors in a more realistic scenario, consisting of a real effort task, and measured prosocial behavior in terms of donations of both time invested in the task and material resources. Results suggest that the effects of frames and incentives depend on the context. The exposure to a normative frame increases prosocial behavior in Experiment 1, while in Experiment 2 the presence of a normative frame increases donations of time but not of material resources. By contrast, in both experiments, participants’ material donations were higher when non-monetary incentives were given, but we found no differences in donations of time between types of incentives in experiment 2.

Suggested Citation

  • Davide Barrera & Sara Romanò & Giulia Bocca, 2025. "Effects of frames and incentives on prosociality in the lab. Comparing abstract and realistic scenarios," Rationality and Society, , vol. 37(2), pages 170-200, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:37:y:2025:i:2:p:170-200
    DOI: 10.1177/10434631241307528
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    References listed on IDEAS

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