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Rewards for information provision in patient referrals: A theoretical model and an experimental test

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  • Brosig-Koch, Jeannette
  • Griebenow, Malte
  • Kifmann, Mathias
  • Then, Franziska

Abstract

We study whether bonus payments for information provision can improve the information flow between physicians. A primary care physician (PCP) decides on the provision of information of varying qualities to a specialist while referring a patient. Our theoretical model, which includes altruism and loss aversion, predicts that bonus payments increase the provision of both high- and low-quality information. Running a controlled laboratory experiment we find support for this prediction. If the beneficiary of information provision receives a higher payoff than the PCP, we observe that PCPs more often pass on high-quality information when the beneficiary is a patient. If the beneficiary receives a lower payoff than the PCP, the type of the beneficiary (specialist or patient) does not affect the provision of high-quality information.

Suggested Citation

  • Brosig-Koch, Jeannette & Griebenow, Malte & Kifmann, Mathias & Then, Franziska, 2022. "Rewards for information provision in patient referrals: A theoretical model and an experimental test," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:86:y:2022:i:c:s0167629622000923
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102677
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Referral; Information; Theoretical model; Laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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