Hypothetical bias in value orientations ring games
The social value orientations ring game is often used to identify behavioral types and provide insight regarding choices made by individuals in market or non-market environments. Following the literature from other experimental fields, this paper is concerned with the presence of hypothetical bias in the method used to identify social value orientation (i.e. a difference between subject behavior when rewards are not salient and subject behavior when rewards are salient). We find no evidence of hypothetical bias in the value orientations or the subjects’ consistency.
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