Fiscal Equalization, Tiebout Competition, and Incentives for Efficiency in a Federalist Country
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- Philippe K. Widmer & George Elias & Peter Zweifel, 2012. "Improving efficiency through consolidation of jurisdictions? Evidence from the cantons of Switzerland," ECON - Working Papers 085, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Hans Pitlik & Christina Seyfried, 2016. "Tax Autonomy of the Swiss Cantons: A Model for Austria?," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 89(6), pages 423-435, June.
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"Party Cues In Elections Under Multilevel Governance: Theory And Evidence From Us States,"
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- Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan, 2012. "Party cues in elections under multilevel governance: Theory and evidence from US states," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-107, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Luca Crivelli & Paola Salari, 2012. "Fiscal federalism and income redistribution through healthcare financing: An empirical analysis for the Swiss cantons," CEPRA working paper 1204, USI Università della Svizzera italiana.
- Schaltegger Christoph A. & Winistörfer Marc M., 2014. "Zur Begrenzung der schleichenden Zentralisierung im Schweizerischen Bundesstaat / On government centralization and its limitation in Switzerland," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 183-228, January.
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KeywordsDEA; efficiency measurement; federalism; fiscal equalization; public finance; Switzerland; Tiebout competition;
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