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Alleged Infringement: The Time of Announcement Does Matter

Author

Listed:
  • Avdasheva, Svetlana

    () (Faculty of Economic Science, National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Shastitko, Andrei

    () (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

Abstract

Discretion in choosing the type of violation after administrative investigation decreases the incentives of alleged violator to produce and present evidence in his favor in the process of investigation, and at the same time increases the expenditure of those who decide to spend resources on presenting evidence. Responsible authority however might be interested in the system of discretionary choice of the type of violation at the late stage of investigation, if performance indicators directly or indirectly rely on the infringement decisions made. One implication of the analysis is doubts on the effectiveness of the antitrust compliance programs developed by companies, which should be subject of the same type of uncertainty about the alleged law violation.

Suggested Citation

  • Avdasheva, Svetlana & Shastitko, Andrei, 2015. "Alleged Infringement: The Time of Announcement Does Matter," Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 72-91, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1512
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Matteo Rizzolli & Luca Stanca, 2012. "Judicial Errors and Crime Deterrence: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(2), pages 311-338.
    5. Luke M. Froeb & Bruce H. Kobayashi, 2012. "Adversarial versus Inquisitorial Justice," Chapters,in: Procedural Law and Economics, chapter 1 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, 2013. "Better that ten guilty persons escape: punishment costs explain the standard of evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 395-411, June.
    7. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    8. Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, 2005. "Does antitrust policy improve consumer welfare? Assessing the evidence," Chapters,in: Governments, Competition and Utility Regulation, chapter 2 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Paul L. Joskow, 2002. "Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 95-116, April.
    10. Parisi, Francesco, 2002. "Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 193-216, August.
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