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La politique monétaire sans monnaie

  • Henri Sterdyniak
  • Jérôme Creel

[eng] The vanishing of the gap between monetary and financial assets prevent central Banks from fixing the interest rate according to the evolution of a monetary aggregate. Central banks fix the short-term nominal interest rate each period; the monetary aggregate, whatever its arbitrary definition, is determined by demand; inflation results jointly from monetary and fiscal policies and from private sector behaviour; monetary financing of public deficits disappeared. Theorists must give up LM curve. Fixing the interest rate according to the final targets of monetary policy (inflation, output) is the best schedule for monetary policy. It does not create price level indetermination, even in models with perfect prices flexibility. The codetermination of inflation, real interest rate and public debt may be a source of instability, conflict or cooperation between fiscal and monetary policies. It is possible to construct a monetary theory without money. JEL Codes : E50, E63. [fre] Le schéma traditionnel de la courbe LM où le taux d'intérêt équilibre une demande de monnaie stable et une offre de monnaie fixée par la banque centrale n'a plus de sens dans les systèmes financiers modernes caractérisés par la disparition de la distinction entre actifs monétaires et non-monétaires. La banque centrale fixe à chaque période le taux d'intérêt monétaire; la masse monétaire, quelle que soit sa définition arbitraire, est déterminée par la demande de monnaie; le taux d'inflation est déterminé, période après période, par le comportement conjoint de la banque centrale, des autorités budgétaires et du secteur privé; la notion de financement monétaire du déficit public disparaît. Il serait souhaitable que la théorie de la politique monétaire rejoigne sa pratique : les théoriciens doivent renoncer à la courbe LM et adopter un schéma réaliste où la banque centrale fixe le taux d'intérêt en fonction des objectifs finaux de la politique monétaire (inflation et production). Comme le montre le succès de la règle de Taylor, les économistes appliqués ont définitivement adopté les fonctions de réaction pour étudier le comportement des banques centrales. Contrairement à ce que prétendent les auteurs monétaristes, l'utilisation d'une règle de taux ne crée pas d'indétermination du niveau des prix ou du niveau d'inflation, même dans les modèles théoriques avec parfaite flexibilité des prix, à partir du moment où la banque centrale sur-indexe le taux d'intérêt sur le taux d'inflation. L'inflation, le taux d'intérêt et la dette publique de long terme sont alors déterminés conjointement par les politiques monétaire et budgétaire. Cette co-détermination peut être une source d'instabilité, de conflit, de domination d'une autorité sur une autre ou au contraire une occasion de coopération. Le cas le plus favorable est celui où les autorités s'entendent sur des objectifs de taux d'inflation et de taux d'intérêt réel. Il est souhaitable et possible de construire une théorie monétaire sans monnaie.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/ofce.1999.1693
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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue de l'OFCE.

Volume (Year): 70 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 111-153

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1999_num_70_1_1693
Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1999.1693
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ofce

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