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Différentiels intersectoriels de salaire et caractéristiques des employeurs en France

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  • Mahmood Araï
  • Gérard Ballot
  • Ali Skalli

Abstract

[spa] Diferenciales intersectoriales de salario y caracterfsticas de empleadores en Francia . iAqué se deben las diferencias intersectoriales de salario en Francia : a ciertas particularidades de los entes empleadores o a la sola heterogeneidad de los trabajadores? Aun descartando cantidad de caracteristîcas individuales de los asalariados, estas diferencias siguen siendo de gran importancia. Por ejemplo, en 1992, un asalariado del sector Entidades financieras cobraba un 34% mâs que el asalariado medio, a caracterfsticas individuales équivalentes. . El papel del ente empleador parece desde luego pertinente en la determinacfon del salario, al contrario de lo que proponen ciertas teorïas. El salario crece con el tamano del ente, salvadas las diferencias. Pero si se élimina el efecto tamano, los salarios son tanto mâs altos cuanto es importante la cuota de mercado : un mecanismo de reparto de la renta parece operar, el cual influye en la estructura de los salarios. . Por otra parte la presencia sindical por si sola tiene un efecto positivo sobre las remuneraciones, incluso si estas no fueron principal objeto de las negociaciones en el ente. Otra fuente de diferencias entre asalariados son los mecanismos de incentivos salariales, segûn si va controlando sus resultados o no el empleador. En fin, los entes brindarfan una compensacion a aquellos asalariados poco autônomos en lo que refiere al tiempo de trabajo, y unas remuneraciones tanto mâs bajas cuanto el esfuerzo es facilmente contrôlable. [fre] Différentiels intersectoriels de salaire et caractéristiquesdes employeurs en France . Quelle est l'importance des différentiels intersectoriels de salaire en France et peuvent-ils être attribués à des caractéristiques des établissements employeurs ou bien à la seule hétérogénéité des travailleurs ? En effet, même après la prise en compte d'un grand nombre de caractéristiques individuelles, les différentiels de salaire demeurent significativement importants. À titre d'exemple, en 1992, par rapport au salarié moyen de l'économie, celui du secteur Organismes financiers perçoit une rémunération de 34 % supérieure, ces deux salariés étant comparables du point de vue de leurs caractéristiques individuelles. . D'où la nécessité de s'interroger sur la pertinence de certaines théories quant au rôle des employeurs dans la détermination des salaires. S'il existe bien une relation croissante entre les salaires d'individus comparables et la taille de l'établissement, il semble aussi que, cet effet taille pris en compte, un mécanisme de partage de la rente influence la structure des salaires puisque, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, ils sont d'autant plus élevés que la part du marché occupée par l'établissement employeur est importante. De plus, la seule présence syndicale entraîne une élévation des rémunérations et ce, même lorsqu'elles n'ont pas été le thème principal des négociations dans l'établissement. Des mécanismes d'incitation salariale engendrent également des différentiels entre les salariés selon que l'établissement employeur contrôle ou non leurs résultats. Les établissements offriraient aussi une compensation à leurs salariés lorsqu'ils sont moins autonomes par rapport à leur temps de travail et des rémunérations d'autant moins élevées que l'effort y est aisément contrôlable. [eng] Intersectorial Wage Differentials and Employer Characteristics in France . Is the reason for intersectorial wage spreads in France certain employer establishment particularities or simply the heterogeneous nature of the workers? These differences remain significant even when many of the employees' individual characteristics are eliminated. For example, in 1992, a wage-earner in the financial institutions sector earned 34% more than the average wage-earner with equivalent individual characteristics. . Therefore, contrary to some theories, the employer establishment would appear to play a role in the setting of wages. Wages admittedly rise in line with the size of the establishment, all things being equal elsewhere. Yet once this size effect has been eliminated, wages are higher the larger the market share of the establishment: a profit-sharing mechanism would seem to be at work, influencing the structure of wages. . Moreover, the mere presence of a union has a positive effect on remuneration, even when this is not the main issue in negotiations with the establishment. Another source of differences between wages takes the form of wage incentive mechanisms, connected with whether or not the employer monitors staff performance. Lastly, establishments would appear to compensate employees who have to be at their work stations a set number of hours a day and pay lower wages the more measurable the worker's output. [ger] Intersektorale Lohn- und Gehaltsunterschiede und Merkmale der franzôsischen Arbeitgeber . Worauf sind die intersektoralen Lohn- und Gehaltsunterschiede in Frankreich zurûckzufùhren? Auf bestimmte Besonderheiten der beschâftigenden Untemehmen oder einzig und allein auf die Heterogenitât der Arbeitnehmer? Selbst wenn man die individuellen Merkmale der Arbeitnehmer weitgehend auBer acht lâBt, bleiben dièse Abweichungen erheblich. Bei gleichen individuellen Merkmalen lag zum Beispiel 1992 das Entgelt eines Arbeitnehmers des Sektors Finanzinstitute um 34% ùber dem des durchschnittlichen Arbeitnehmers. . Entgegen den Erklârungen mancher Theorien scheint somit die Rolle des beschâftigenden Unternehmens bei der Bestimmung des Entgelts ausschlaggebend zu sein. Bei sonst gleichen Merkmalen steigt zwar das Entgelt mit der BetriebsgrôBe. Nach Eliminierung dieses GrôBen- effektes sind jedoch die Lôhne und Gehâlter um so hôher, als der Marktanteil des Betriebs erheblich ist. Wie es scheint, kommt hier ein Mechanismus der Ertrags- verteilung zum Tragen, der die Lohn- und Gehaltsstruktur beeinfluBt. . Im ubrigen hat das bloBe Vorhandensein einer Gewerk- schaft einen positiven EinfluB auf die Vergùtungen, selbst wenn dièse nicht Hauptthema der innerbetrieblichen Verhandlungen gewesen sind. Ein anderer Faktor der Differenzierung zwischen Arbeitnehmern sind die Lohnanreiz-Mechanismen, die davon abhàngen, ob der Arbeitgeber Kontrollen durchfùhrt oder nicht. Die Betriebe wûrden demnach den Arbeitnehmern, die mittels Stechuhr kontrolliert werden, einen Lohnausgleich bieten und ein Entgelt zahlen, das um so geringer ist, als sich die Bemùhungen der Arbeitnehmer leicht ùberwachen lassen.

Suggested Citation

  • Mahmood Araï & Gérard Ballot & Ali Skalli, 1996. "Différentiels intersectoriels de salaire et caractéristiques des employeurs en France," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 299(1), pages 37-58.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1996_num_299_1_6161
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1996.6161
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Alain Bayet, 1996. "Carrières continues, carrières incomplètes et salaires," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 299(1), pages 21-36.
    2. Cahuc, Pierre & Gianella, Christian & Goux, Dominique & Zylberberg, Andre, 2002. "Equalizing Wage Differences and Bargaining Power: Evidence from a Panel of French Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 3510, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Plasman, Robert & Rycx, Francois & Tojerow, Ilan, 2006. "Industry Wage Differentials, Unobserved Ability, and Rent-Sharing: Evidence from Matched Worker-Firm Data, 1995-2002," IZA Discussion Papers 2387, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    4. Philip Du Caju & François Rycx & Ilan Tojerow, 2011. "Inter‐Industry Wage Differentials: How Much Does Rent Sharing Matter?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 79(4), pages 691-717, July.
    5. Du Caju, Philip & Rycx, Francois & Tojerow, Ilan, 2008. "Rent-Sharing and the Cyclicality of Wage Differentials," IZA Discussion Papers 3844, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    6. Philip Du Caju & François Rycx & Ilan Tojerow, 2012. "Wage structure effects of international trade in a small open economy: the case of Belgium," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 148(2), pages 297-331, June.
    7. Alain Bayet & Christel Colin, 1998. "Les évolutions individuelles de salaire sur dix ans sont difficiles à prévoir," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 314(1), pages 3-24.
    8. Brenda Gannon & Robert Plasman & Francois Rycx & Ilan Tojerow, 2007. "Inter-Industry Wage Differentials and the Gender Wage Gap: Evidence from European Countries," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 38(1), pages 135-155.
    9. Robert Plasman & François Rycx & Ilan Tojerow, 2006. "Industry wage differentials, unobserved ability, and rent-sharing: evidence from matched employer-employee, 1992-2005," DULBEA Working Papers 06-14.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    10. Robert Plasman & François Rycx & Ilan Tojerow, 2007. "Wage differentials in Belgium: the role of worker and employer characteristics," Brussels Economic Review, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 50(1), pages 11-40.
    11. François Rycx, 2002. "Inter-industry wage differentials: evidence from Belgium in a cross-national perspective," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/791, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    12. Sajjad Haider Bhatti & Jean Bourdon & Muhammad Aslam, 2013. "Economic Returns to Education in France: OLS and Instrumental Variable Estimations," Lahore Journal of Economics, Department of Economics, The Lahore School of Economics, vol. 18(2), pages 51-63, July-Dec.
    13. Philip Du Caju & François Rycx & Ilan Tojerow, 2011. "Wage Structure Effects of International Trade: Evidence from a Small Open Economy," Working Papers CEB 11-011, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    14. Magda, Iga & Rycx, Francois & Tojerow, Ilan & Valsamis, Daphné, 2008. "Wage Differentials across Sectors in Europe: An East-West Comparison," IZA Discussion Papers 3830, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    15. Brenda Gannon & Brian Nolan, 2004. "Inter-Industry Wage Differentials in Ireland," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 35(2), pages 157-182.
    16. Lanfranchi, Joseph & Ohlsson, Henry & Skalli, Ali, 2002. "Compensating wage differentials and shift work preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 393-398, February.
    17. Amir Borges Ferreira Neto & Ricardo Da Silva Fregugli, 2014. "How Much Does Talent Matter? Evidences From The Brazilian Formal Cultural Industry," Anais do XLI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 41st Brazilian Economics Meeting] 233, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
    18. Mahmood Araï & Ali Skalli & Gérard Ballot & Claude Jessua, 1996. "Rendements de l'ancienneté des individus et taille des établissements," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(3), pages 623-632.
    19. Thomas Breda, 2010. "Firms' rents, workers' bargaining power and the union wage premium in France," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564903, HAL.
    20. Thomas Breda, 2010. "Firms' rents, workers' bargaining power and the union wage premium in France," Working Papers halshs-00564903, HAL.

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