Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
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- Beath,Andrew & Christia,Fotini & Egorov,Georgy & Enikolopov,Ruben, 2015. "Electoral rules and political selection : theory and evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7361, The World Bank.
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