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Empirical Methods for the Law

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  • Christoph Engel

Abstract

Normative legal argument based on empirical evidence is not necessarily best served by standards from the social sciences. Precautionary concern for false negatives may call for an adjustment of the significance level. That all legal choice is historically contingent, that legal problems tend to be ill-defined, and that strategic actors have an incentive to bias the generation of evidence create further challenges. Yet the law can capitalize on the adversarial principle. Competition among interested parties helps contain the strategic element and spurs the creative search for better evidence. This leads to suggestive, but institutionally contained, empirical evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Engel, 2018. "Empirical Methods for the Law," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 174(1), pages 5-23, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201803)174:1_5:emftl_2.0.tx_2-d
    DOI: 10.1628/093245617X15096094637968
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    Cited by:

    1. Marina Agranov & Anastasia Buyalskaya, 2022. "Deterrence Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3573-3589, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    normative claims; frequentist statistics; significance; power; structural-equation model; finite mixture; Bayesian statistics; prediction; machine learning;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • C01 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Econometrics
    • C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
    • C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
    • C18 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Methodolical Issues: General
    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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