Empirical Methods for the Law
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DOI: 10.1628/093245617X15096094637968
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- Christoph Engel, 2017. "Empirical Methods for the Law," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Marina Agranov & Anastasia Buyalskaya, 2022. "Deterrence Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3573-3589, May.
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More about this item
Keywords
normative claims; frequentist statistics; significance; power; structural-equation model; finite mixture; Bayesian statistics; prediction; machine learning;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
- C01 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Econometrics
- C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
- C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
- C18 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Methodolical Issues: General
- C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
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