The Coevolution of Behavior and Normative Expectations. Customary Law in the Lab
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More about this item
Keywordsexperiment; Public Good; Customary Law; Normativity; Crowding Outs;
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- C14 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-04-03 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2012-04-03 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-04-03 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2012-04-03 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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