Erga Omnes Norms, Institutionalization, and Constitutionalism in International Law
Erga omnes norms are those that give third-party states, rather than just the victim, legal claims against states that violate them. This paper argues that ordinary twoparty norms arise when states recognize that a norm violation injures only one state and that other states that seek to retaliate on that state's behalf are likely using the violation as a pretext for predatory behavior. Erga omnes norms arise when states recognize that a norm violation injures multiple states and that states have an incentive to free ride rather than retaliate against the violator.
Volume (Year): 165 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.mohr.de/jite|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alan O. Sykes, 2005. "Public versus Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 631-666, 06.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200903)165:1_5:eoniac_2.0.tx_2-c. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.