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Empirical Methods for the Law

Author

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  • Christoph Engel

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

Abstract

To their credit, empirical legal scholars try to live up to the highest methodological standards from the social sciences. But these standards do not always match the legal research question. This paper focuses on normative legal argument based on empirical evidence. Whether there is a normative problem, and whether legal intervention promises to mitigate the problem, requires a decision. If uncertainty cannot be completely removed, the legal decision-maker must weigh the risk of false positives against the risk of false negatives. This may call for an adjustment of the significance level. The fact that all legal choice is historically contingent, that legal problems tend to be ill-defined, and that strategic actors have an incentive to bias the generation of evidence defy frequentist statistics. Yet the law can capitalize on the adversarial principle. Competition among interested parties helps contain the strategic element and spurs the creative search for better evidence. This leads to suggestive, but institutionally contained empirical evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph Engel, 2017. "Empirical Methods for the Law," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2017_07, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2017_07
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Marina Agranov & Anastasia Buyalskaya, 2022. "Deterrence Effects of Enforcement Schemes: An Experimental Study," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3573-3589, May.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • C01 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Econometrics
    • C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
    • C12 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Hypothesis Testing: General
    • C18 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Methodolical Issues: General
    • C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

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