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Information-driven coordination: experimental results with heterogeneous individuals

  • Viktoriya Semeshenko

    ()

  • Alexis Garapin

    ()

  • Bernard Ruffieux

    ()

  • Mirta Gordon

    ()

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-009-9161-3
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 69 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 119-142

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:1:p:119-142
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-009-9161-3
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/11238/PS2

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  1. Giovanna Devetag, 2003. "Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 53-73, June.
  2. Roland Bénabou, 1996. "Equity and Efficiency in Human Capital Investment: The Local Connection," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 237-264.
  3. Laslier, J.-F. & Topol, R. & Walliser, B., 1999. "A Behavioral Learning Process in Games," Papers 99-03, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  4. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & José A. Scheinkman, 1996. "Crime and Social Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(2), pages 507-548.
  5. Denis Phan & Mirta Gordon & J.-P. Nadal & J. Vannimenus, 2005. "Multiple equilibria in a monopoly market with heterogeneous agents and externalities," Post-Print halshs-00078792, HAL.
  6. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
  7. Brian Krauth, 2006. "Social interactions in small groups," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(2), pages 414-433, May.
  8. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1990. "Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 234-48, March.
  9. M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
  10. Van Huyck, John B. & Cook, Joseph P. & Battalio, Raymond C., 1997. "Adaptive behavior and coordination failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 483-503, April.
  11. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
  12. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 2001. "Coordination and information: recent experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 345-351, December.
  13. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1994. "Systems Competition and Network Effects," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 93-115, Spring.
  14. Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(2), pages 739-771.
  15. Steven N. Durlauf, 1992. "A Theory of Persistent Income Inequality," NBER Working Papers 4056, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2007. "When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 331-344, September.
  17. Rapoport, Amnon & Seale, Darryl A. & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "Coordination and Learning Behavior in Large Groups with Asymmetric Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 111-136, April.
  18. Kooreman, P. & Soetevent, A., 2007. "A discrete choice model with social interactions; with an application to high school teen behavior," Other publications TiSEM 39fff234-271a-4058-9912-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  19. Crawford, Vincent P & Haller, Hans, 1990. "Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 571-95, May.
  20. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2003. "Altruistic Punishment in Humans," Microeconomics 0305006, EconWPA.
  21. Nicolas Curien & Michel Gensollen, 1987. "Les théories de la demande de raccordement téléphonique," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 38(2), pages 203-256.
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