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Who Should Control a Corporation? Toward a Contingency Stakeholder Model for Allocating Ownership Rights

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  • Alessandro Zattoni

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  • Alessandro Zattoni, 2011. "Who Should Control a Corporation? Toward a Contingency Stakeholder Model for Allocating Ownership Rights," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 255-274, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:103:y:2011:i:2:p:255-274
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-011-0864-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Susanne Kremhelmer & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2008. "Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1262-1284, August.
    2. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    3. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 32-42, January.
    4. Cornelius, Peter K. & Kogut, Bruce (ed.), 2003. "Corporate Governance and Capital Flows in Global Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195161717.
    5. Alexander Brink, 2010. "Enlightened Corporate Governance: Specific Investments by Employees as Legitimation for Residual Claims," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 93(4), pages 641-651, June.
    6. Alfred D. Chandler, 1969. "Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262530090, December.
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    8. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    9. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    10. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    11. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2006. "A Social Contract Account for CSR as an Extended Model of Corporate Governance (I): Rational Bargaining and Justification," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 259-281, October.
    12. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    13. Carroll, Archie B., 1991. "The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 39-48.
    14. Lorenzo Sacconi, 2007. "A Social Contract Account for CSR as an Extended Model of Corporate Governance (II): Compliance, Reputation and Reciprocity," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 75(1), pages 77-96, September.
    15. Russell W. Coff, 1999. "When Competitive Advantage Doesn't Lead to Performance: The Resource-Based View and Stakeholder Bargaining Power," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 10(2), pages 119-133, April.
    16. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    17. Barzel,Yoram, 1997. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597135, February.
    18. William G. Ouchi, 1979. "A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(9), pages 833-848, September.
    19. Goodpaster, Kenneth E., 1991. "Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 53-73, January.
    20. Kester, W Carl, 1992. "Industrial Groups as Systems of Contractual Governance," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 8(3), pages 24-44, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. J. Robert Mitchell & Ronald K. Mitchell & Richard A. Hunt & David M. Townsend & Jae H. Lee, 2022. "Stakeholder Engagement, Knowledge Problems and Ethical Challenges," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 175(1), pages 75-94, January.
    2. Jae Eun Shin & Seung-Weon Yoo & Gun Lee, 2020. "The Effects of Blockholder Dispersion on the Informativeness of Earnings: Evidence from Korea," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(22), pages 1-18, November.
    3. Charbel Chedrawi & Souheir Osta, 2017. "CSR in the banking sector: A legitimacy approach to the shareholders' and stakeholders' debate," Post-Print hal-01815483, HAL.
    4. Faisal Hameed & Mohammad Alfaraj & Khizar Hameed, 2023. "The Association of Board Characteristics and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Quality: Empirical Evidence from Pakistan," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(24), pages 1-24, December.
    5. Rae André, 2012. "Assessing the Accountability of the Benefit Corporation: Will This New Gray Sector Organization Enhance Corporate Social Responsibility?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 110(1), pages 133-150, September.
    6. Dorothee Feils & Manzur Rahman & Florin Şabac, 2018. "Corporate Governance Systems Diversity: A Coasian Perspective on Stakeholder Rights," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 150(2), pages 451-466, June.
    7. Eugenio Zubeltzu‐Jaka & Igor Álvarez‐Etxeberria & Eduardo Ortas, 2020. "The effect of the size of the board of directors on corporate social performance: A meta‐analytic approach," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(3), pages 1361-1374, May.
    8. Christine Mallin & Giovanna Michelon & Davide Raggi, 2013. "Monitoring Intensity and Stakeholders’ Orientation: How Does Governance Affect Social and Environmental Disclosure?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 114(1), pages 29-43, April.
    9. John Parnell & Gregory Scott & Georgios Angelopoulos, 2013. "Benchmarking Tendencies in Managerial Mindsets: Prioritizing Stockholders and Stakeholders in Peru, South Africa, and the United States," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 118(3), pages 589-605, December.
    10. Francesco Perrini & Angeloantonio Russo & Antonio Tencati & Clodia Vurro, 2011. "Deconstructing the Relationship Between Corporate Social and Financial Performance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 102(1), pages 59-76, March.

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