Gouvernement d’entreprise et innovation
[eng] Corporate Governance and Innovation Any attempt to address the relationship between corporate governance and innovation needs to distinguish the organisational and the institutional level of analysis. At the organisational level, the economic literature doesn’t give any response, as theories of the firm focusing on governance issues (whether it is shareholder or stakeholder model) fail to take into account the innovation process. At the institutional level, the author argues that the « short-termism bias » of outsider systems is not a convincing argument in favour of insider systems and that these two different corporate governance structures may help or hinder different types of innovations and investments. JEL classifications : G30, D29, O31 [fre] Pour expliciter l’effet du gouvernement d’entreprise sur l’innovation, il est nécessaire de distinguer deux niveaux d’analyse, le niveau organisationnel et le niveau institutionnel. Au niveau organisationnel, les modèles shareholder et stakeholder s’appuient sur des constructions théoriques de la firme dans lesquelles le processus d’innovation est absent. Au niveau institutionnel, si l’argument de courtermisme du modèle outsider paraît peu pertinent, en revanche, l’hypothèse d’une influence de la structure de gouvernance sur la structure de l’investissement, et notamment la répartition entre investissement de R& D et investissement en capital fixe, est partiellement démontrée par divers travaux. Classification JEL : G30, D29, O31
Volume (Year): 63 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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