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The interaction of firing costs and firm training

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  • Wolfgang Lechthaler

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of firing costs in a broader setup than what is usually done, allowing for on-the-job training. By doing so the traditional analysis is extended with respect to two points: On the one hand firing costs clearly increase firm training because worker and firm are less likely to separate. On the other hand, firm training gives firms the opportunity to lower the costs of firing restrictions: After all the value of output of a well-trained worker is less likely to turn negative. Through these two channels firm training is able to diminish the negative effects of firing restrictions usually discussed in the literature.
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  • Wolfgang Lechthaler, 2009. "The interaction of firing costs and firm training," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 331-350, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:36:y:2009:i:3:p:331-350
    DOI: 10.1007/s10663-008-9088-x
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    Cited by:

    1. Lechthaler, Wolfgang & Snower, Dennis J., 2012. "Institutions and training inequality," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 88-104.
    2. Bratti, Massimiliano & Conti, Maurizio & Sulis, Giovanni, 2019. "Employment Protection and Firm-Provided Training: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from a Labour Market Reform," IZA Discussion Papers 12773, IZA Network @ LISER.
    3. Zenou, Yves & Lindquist, Matthew & Sauermann, Jan, 2015. "Network Effects on Worker Productivity," CEPR Discussion Papers 10928, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Bratti, Massimiliano & Conti, Maurizio & Sulis, Giovanni, 2018. "Employment Protection, Temporary Contracts and Firm-Provided Training: Evidence from Italy," IZA Discussion Papers 11339, IZA Network @ LISER.
    5. Giulio Pedrini, 2017. "Law and economics of training: a taxonomy of the main legal and institutional tools addressing suboptimal investments in human capital development," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 83-105, February.
    6. Pierre-Jean Messe & Benedicte Rouland, 2012. "Stricter employment protection and firms incentives to train: The case of French older workers," TEPP Working Paper 2012-04, TEPP.
    7. Messe, Pierre-Jean & Rouland, Bénédicte, 2014. "Stricter employment protection and firms' incentives to sponsor training: The case of French older workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 14-26.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J68 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Public Policy
    • M53 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Training

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