IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v64y2018i10p4552-4571.html

Incentives and Ratcheting in a Multiproduct Firm: A Field Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Francisco Brahm

    (Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 1AG, United Kingdom; School of Management, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Macul, Santiago 7820436, Chile)

  • Joaquin Poblete

    (School of Management, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Macul, Santiago 7820436, Chile)

Abstract

We develop a model and derive behavioral predictions for a multiproduct sales force subject to goals set based on past performance. We test these predictions using a field experiment in which 53 salespersons from a Chilean beverage company face exogenous variations in monthly sales goals. Confirming our predictions, we found that (1) absent strategic considerations—no goal ratcheting—salespersons increase (decrease) sales in the product category for which the return to effort increases (decreases), (2) including strategic considerations behavior reverses: salespersons who expect high goal ratcheting decrease (increase) sales in the category for which the return to effort increases (decreases), (3) sales did not change for the average salespersons, reflecting heterogeneity in the expectations of goal ratcheting rather than unresponsiveness to incentives. Our study points at the importance of the dynamics of incentive design, in particular, the importance of understanding the dynamics of goal setting in firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Francisco Brahm & Joaquin Poblete, 2018. "Incentives and Ratcheting in a Multiproduct Firm: A Field Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4552-4571, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:64:y:2018:i:10:p:4552-4571
    DOI: 10.287/mnsc.2017.2861
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.287/mnsc.2017.2861
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.287/mnsc.2017.2861?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Martin L. Weitzman, 1980. "The "Ratchet Principle" and Performance Incentives," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 302-308, Spring.
    2. Shannon W. Anderson & Henri C. Dekker & Karen L. Sedatole, 2010. "An Empirical Examination of Goals and Performance-to-Goal Following the Introduction of an Incentive Bonus Plan with Participative Goal Setting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(1), pages 90-109, January.
    3. Tomasz Obloj & Metin Sengul, 2012. "Incentive Life-cycles: Learning and the Division of Value in Firms," Post-Print hal-00853783, HAL.
    4. Uri Gneezy & Stephan Meier & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2011. "When and Why Incentives (Don't) Work to Modify Behavior," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(4), pages 191-210, Fall.
    5. Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2011. "Field Experiments with Firms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 25(3), pages 63-82, Summer.
    6. Sebastian Goerg & Sebastian Kube, 2012. "Goals (th)at Work – Goals, Monetary Incentives, and Workers’ Performance," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2012_19, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    7. Glenn W. Harrison & John A. List, 2004. "Field Experiments," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1009-1055, December.
    8. Supreet Kaur & Michael Kremer & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2022. "Erratum: Self-Control at Work," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(8), pages 2223-2224.
    9. Gary Charness & Peter Kuhn & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Competition and the Ratchet Effect," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(3), pages 513-547.
    10. Brice Corgnet & Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres & Roberto Hernán-González, 2015. "Goal Setting and Monetary Incentives: When Large Stakes Are Not Enough," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(12), pages 2926-2944, December.
    11. Hsiaw, Alice, 2013. "Goal-setting and self-control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 601-626.
    12. Charles Bellemare & Bruce Shearer, 2014. "Measuring Ratchet Effects within a Firm: Evidence from a Field Experiment varying Contractual Commitment," Cahiers de recherche 1401, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
    13. Johannes Abeler & Armin Falk & Lorenz Goette & David Huffman, 2011. "Reference Points and Effort Provision," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 470-492, April.
    14. A. Colin Cameron & Douglas L. Miller, 2015. "A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 50(2), pages 317-372.
    15. Murali Mantrala & Sönke Albers & Fabio Caldieraro & Ove Jensen & Kissan Joseph & Manfred Krafft & Chakravarthi Narasimhan & Srinath Gopalakrishna & Andris Zoltners & Rajiv Lal & Leonard Lodish, 2010. "Sales force modeling: State of the field and research agenda," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 255-272, September.
    16. Sanjay Jain, 2012. "Self-Control and Incentives: An Analysis of Multiperiod Quota Plans," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 855-869, September.
    17. Gibbons, Robert, 1987. "Piece-Rate Incentive Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages 413-429, October.
    18. David J. Cooper, 1999. "Gaming against Managers in Incentive Systems: Experimental Results with Chinese Students and Chinese Managers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 781-804, September.
    19. Rajiv Lal & V. Srinivasan, 1993. "Compensation Plans for Single- and Multi-Product Salesforces: An Application of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Model," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 39(7), pages 777-793, July.
    20. Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, 2001. "Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
    21. Rajshri Jayaraman & Debraj Ray & Francis de Véricourt, 2016. "Anatomy of a Contract Change," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 316-358, February.
    22. Bouwens, Jan & Kroos, Peter, 2011. "Target ratcheting and effort reduction," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1-2), pages 171-185, February.
    23. Bruce Shearer, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 513-534.
    24. Tomasz Obloj & Metin Sengul, 2012. "Incentive Life-cycles: Learning and the Division of Value in Firms," Post-Print hal-00731048, HAL.
    25. Canice Prendergast, 2015. "The Empirical Content of Pay-for-Performance," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(2), pages 242-261.
    26. Prabhakant Sinha & Andris A. Zoltners, 2001. "Sales-Force Decision Models: Insights from 25 Years of Implementation," Interfaces, INFORMS, vol. 31(3_supplem), pages 8-44, June.
    27. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, 2007. "What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(2), pages 153-174, Spring.
    28. John List & Sally Sadoff & Mathis Wagner, 2011. "So you want to run an experiment, now what? Some simple rules of thumb for optimal experimental design," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(4), pages 439-457, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bruce S. Shearer, 2022. "Piece‐rate cuts and ratchet effects," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1371-1403, August.
    2. Rosario Macera, 2024. "The roles of selection and practice in mitigating negative responses to high-powered incentives," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(5), pages 973-1000, November.
    3. Johannes Abeler & David Huffman & Collin Raymond, 2025. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality, and Effort Provision," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 115(12), pages 4404-4437, December.
    4. Cao, Guangyu & Weng, Xi & Xu, Mingwei & Zhou, Li-An, 2025. "The political economy of ratchet effect: Evidence from China’s environmental regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 131(C).
    5. Abeler, Johannes & Huffman, David B. & Raymond, Collin, 2023. "Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 16284, IZA Network @ LISER.
    6. Ramírez, Vicente & Galilea, Patricia & Poblete, Joaquín & Silva, Hugo E., 2022. "Team-based incentives in transportation firms: An experiment," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 1-12.
    7. Zuomiao Xie & Shiqi Yuan & Jinjing Zhu & Alistair Palferman, 2023. "Dynamic value sharing based on employee contribution as a competitiveness-enhancing device," Humanities and Social Sciences Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2018. "Output restriction and the ratchet effect: Evidence from a real-effort work task," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 182-202.
    2. Cardella, Eric & Depew, Briggs, 2016. "Testing for the Ratchet Effect: Evidence from a Real-Effort Work Task," IZA Discussion Papers 9981, IZA Network @ LISER.
    3. Eric Floyd & John A. List, 2016. "Using Field Experiments in Accounting and Finance," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 54(2), pages 437-475, May.
    4. Victor Gonzalez-Jimenez & Patricio S. Dalton & Charles N. Noussair, 2019. "The Dark Side of Monetary Bonuses: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Vienna Economics Papers vie1909, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    5. Tat Y. Chan & Jia Li & Lamar Pierce, 2014. "Compensation and Peer Effects in Competing Sales Teams," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(8), pages 1965-1984, August.
    6. Aleksandr Alekseev, 2022. "Give me a challenge or give me a raise," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(1), pages 170-202, February.
    7. Victor Gonzalez-Jimenez & Patricio S. Dalton & Charles N. Noussair, 2019. "The Dark Side of Monetary Bonuses: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Vienna Economics Papers 1909, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    8. Fanghella, Valeria & Ploner, Matteo & Tavoni, Massimo, 2021. "Energy saving in a simulated environment: An online experiment of the interplay between nudges and financial incentives," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    9. Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
    10. Guido Friebel & Matthias Heinz & Miriam Krueger & Nikolay Zubanov, 2017. "Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(8), pages 2168-2203, August.
    11. Koch, Alexander K. & Nafziger, Julia, 2020. "Motivational goal bracketing: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    12. Bruce S. Shearer, 2022. "Piece‐rate cuts and ratchet effects," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(3), pages 1371-1403, August.
    13. Corgnet, Brice & Gómez-Miñambres, Joaquín & Hernán-González, Roberto, 2018. "Goal setting in the principal–agent model: Weak incentives for strong performance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 311-326.
    14. Young, Benjamin, 2024. "Expectations or rational expectations? A theory of systematic goal deviation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 25-37.
    15. Cettolin, Elena & Cole, Kym & Dalton, Patricio, 2022. "Improving Workers’ Performance in Small Firms : A Randomized Experiment on Goal Setting in Ghana," Discussion Paper 2022-028, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    16. Brice Corgnet & Joaquín Gómez-Miñambres & Roberto Hernán-González, 2015. "Goal Setting and Monetary Incentives: When Large Stakes Are Not Enough," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(12), pages 2926-2944, December.
    17. Delfgaauw, Josse & Dur, Robert & Non, Arjan & Verbeke, Willem, 2014. "Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay: A field experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 1-13.
    18. Jonas Pilgaard Kaiser & Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2024. "Does goal revision undermine self-regulation through goals? An experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(3), pages 604-636, July.
    19. Campos-Mercade, Pol & Thiemann, Petra & Wengström, Erik, 2025. "Performance Incentives in Education: The Role of Goal Mismatch," Working Papers 2025:5, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    20. Rajshri Jayaraman & Debraj Ray & Francis de V´ericourt, 2014. "Productivity Response to a Contract Change," Working Papers id:5685, eSocialSciences.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:64:y:2018:i:10:p:4552-4571. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Asher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.