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The Pitfalls of Subsystem Integration: When Less Is More

Author

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  • Sanjiv Erat

    (Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093)

  • Stylianos Kavadias

    (Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332)

  • Cheryl Gaimon

    (Scheller College of Business, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia 30332)

Abstract

In various industries end-product manufacturers acquire core subsystems from upstream technology provider firms and focus primarily on efficient end-product integration. We examine the strategic interactions between a technology firm that introduces a new subsystem and the respective end-product manufacturers ("integrators"). We analyze how the fraction of end-product functionalities prepackaged into the subsystem impacts the optimal introduction strategy and the relative value appropriation power across the industries. Offering a subsystem that performs many end-product functions has a dual effect on the provider's profits. On the positive side, the provider extracts a higher ease-of-use rent from the integrators because of the easier/cheaper integration. On the negative side, such subsystems may curtail the adopters' ability for competitive differentiation and render adoption less valuable. We discuss the role of subsystem functionality in value appropriation in technology markets, and we highlight the perils of subsystem overintegration. This paper was accepted by Kamalini Ramdas, entrepreneurship and innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • Sanjiv Erat & Stylianos Kavadias & Cheryl Gaimon, 2013. "The Pitfalls of Subsystem Integration: When Less Is More," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 659-676, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:59:y:2013:i:3:p:659-676
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1592
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    2. Nicos Savva & Niyazi Taneri, 2015. "The Role of Equity, Royalty, and Fixed Fees in Technology Licensing to University Spin-Offs," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(6), pages 1323-1343, June.
    3. Joachim Henkel & Alexander Hoffmann, 2019. "Value capture in hierarchically organized value chains," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 260-279, April.
    4. Wang, Jingqi & Shin, Hyoduk & Zhou, Qin, 2021. "The optimal investment decision for an innovative supplier in a supply chain," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 292(3), pages 967-979.
    5. Aydin, Ayhan & Parker, Rodney P., 2018. "Innovation and technology diffusion in competitive supply chains," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 265(3), pages 1102-1114.
    6. Cui, Qinquan, 2019. "Quality investment, and the contract manufacturer’s encroachment," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(2), pages 407-418.
    7. Jingqi Wang & Xiaole Wu & Viswanathan Krishnan, 2018. "Decision Structure and Performance of Networked Technology Supply Chains," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 20(2), pages 199-216, May.
    8. Chen, Jingxian & Liang, Liang & Yao, Dong-qing, 2017. "An analysis of intellectual property licensing strategy under duopoly competition: Component or product-based?," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 502-513.
    9. Jing, Fei & Lin, Jun & Zhang, Qiao & Qian, Yanjun, 2022. "New technology introduction and product rollover strategies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 302(1), pages 324-336.
    10. Lo Nigro, Giovanna, 2016. "The effect of early or late R&D inbound alliance on innovation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(5), pages 1791-1795.
    11. Li, Qing & Zhang, Huaige & Hong, Xianpei, 2020. "Knowledge structure of technology licensing based on co-keywords network: A review and future directions," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 154-165.

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