A perverse ‘net’ effect? Health insurance and ex-ante moral hazard in Ghana
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lisa Bagnoli, 2017. "Does National Health Insurance Improve Children's Health ?National and Regional Evidence from Ghana," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-03, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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More about this item
KeywordsHealth insurance; Moral hazard; Prevention; Malaria; Bed nets; Ghana; Fixed effects model; Propensity score matching;
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