IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlawec/v50y2007p519-538.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard

Author

Listed:
  • Jonathan Klick
  • Thomas Stratmann

Abstract

In the face of rising rates of diabetes, many states have passed laws requiring health insurance plans to cover medical treatments for the disease. Although supporters of the mandates expect them to improve the health of diabetics, the mandates have the potential to generate a moral hazard to the extent that medical treatments might displace individual behavioral improvements. Another possibility is that the mandates do little to improve insurance coverage for most individuals, as previous research on benefit mandates has suggested that mandates often duplicate what plans already cover. To examine the effects of these mandates, we employ a triple-differences methodology comparing the change in the gap in body mass index (BMI) between diabetics and nondiabetics in mandate and nonmandate states. We find that mandates do generate a moral hazard problem, with diabetics exhibiting higher BMIs after the adoption of these mandates.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, 2007. "Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 519-538.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:50:y:2007:p:519-538 DOI: 10.1086/519813
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/519813
    Download Restriction: Access to the online full text or PDF requires a subscription.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jonathan Klick & Sara Markowitz, 2006. "Are mental health insurance mandates effective? Evidence from suicides," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(1), pages 83-97.
    2. Chou, Shin-Yi & Grossman, Michael & Saffer, Henry, 2004. "An economic analysis of adult obesity: results from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 565-587, May.
    3. David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2003. "Why Have Americans Become More Obese?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 93-118, Summer.
    4. Stephen T. Parente & David S. Salkever & Joan DaVanzo, 2005. "The role of consumer knowledge of insurance benefits in the demand for preventive health care among the elderly," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(1), pages 25-38.
    5. Viscusi, W Kip, 1984. "The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-Resistant Packaging on Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 324-327, May.
    6. Kahn, Matthew E, 1999. "Diabetic Risk Taking: The Role of Information, Education and Medication," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 147-164, August.
    7. Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 177-183, May.
    8. Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, 2010. "Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 77(1), pages 39-84.
    2. Dhaval Dave & Robert Kaestner, 2009. "Health insurance and ex ante moral hazard: evidence from Medicare," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 367-390, December.
    3. Slade, Alexander N., 2012. "Health investment decisions in response to diabetes information in older Americans," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 502-520.
    4. Bailey, James, 2013. "Who pays for obesity? Evidence from health insurance benefit mandates," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 287-289.
    5. repec:pal:gpprii:v:43:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1057_s41288-017-0055-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. John E. Murray, 2011. "Asymmetric Information and Countermeasures in Early Twentieth‐Century American Short‐Term Disability Microinsurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 78(1), pages 117-138, March.
    7. Yingying Dong, 2013. "How Health Insurance Affects Health Care Demand—A Structural Analysis Of Behavioral Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 1324-1344, April.
    8. McBain, Florence, 2014. "Health insurance and health environment: India’s subsidized health insurance in a context of limited water and sanitation services," Working Papers 179200, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
    9. Christoph Engel, 2013. "Behavioral Law and Economics: Empirical Methods," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_01, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    10. Ali Moghtaderi & Avi Dor, 2016. "Immunization and Moral Hazard: The HPV Vaccine and Uptake of Cancer Screening," NBER Working Papers 22523, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Kevin Callison & Michael F. Pesko, 2016. "The Effect of Mandatory Paid Sick Leave Laws on Labor Market Outcomes, Health Care Utilization, and Health Behaviors," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles 16-265, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    12. Spenkuch, Jörg L., 2012. "Moral hazard and selection among the poor: Evidence from a randomized experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 72-85.
    13. Thomas Stratmann, 2007. "Mandatory and affordable health insurance: commentary," Regional Economic Development, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Oct, pages 29-31.
    14. Dhaval M. Dave & Robert Kaestner & George L. Wehby, 2015. "Does Medicaid Coverage for Pregnant Women Affect Prenatal Health Behaviors?," NBER Working Papers 21049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Yilma, Zelalem & van Kempen, Luuk & de Hoop, Thomas, 2012. "A perverse ‘net’ effect? Health insurance and ex-ante moral hazard in Ghana," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 138-147.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:50:y:2007:p:519-538. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division). General contact details of provider: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/ .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.