Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard
In the face of rising rates of diabetes, many states have passed laws requiring health insurance plans to cover medical treatments for the disease. Although supporters of the mandates expect them to improve the health of diabetics, the mandates have the potential to generate a moral hazard to the extent that medical treatments might displace individual behavioral improvements. Another possibility is that the mandates do little to improve insurance coverage for most individuals, as previous research on benefit mandates has suggested that mandates often duplicate what plans already cover. To examine the effects of these mandates, we employ a triple-differences methodology comparing the change in the gap in body mass index (BMI) between diabetics and nondiabetics in mandate and nonmandate states. We find that mandates do generate a moral hazard problem, with diabetics exhibiting higher BMIs after the adoption of these mandates.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2003.
"Why Have Americans Become More Obese?,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 93-118, Summer.
- Shapiro, Jesse & Glaeser, Edward & Cutler, David, 2003. "Why Have Americans Become More Obese," Scholarly Articles 2640583, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2003. "Why Have Americans Become More Obese?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1994, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- David Cutler & Edward Glaeser & Jesse Shapiro, 2003. "Why Have Americans Become More Obese?," NBER Working Papers 9446, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Klick & Sara Markowitz, 2006. "Are mental health insurance mandates effective? Evidence from suicides," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(1), pages 83-97.
- Sara Markowitz & Jonathan Klick, "undated". "Are Mental Health Insurance Mandates Effective?: Evidence from Suicides," Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark 2004-003, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark.
- Jonathan Klick & Sara Markowitz, 2003. "Are Mental Health Insurance Mandates Effective? Evidence from Suicides," NBER Working Papers 9994, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kahn, Matthew E, 1999. "Diabetic Risk Taking: The Role of Information, Education and Medication," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 147-164, August.
- Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 177-183, May.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
- Chou, Shin-Yi & Grossman, Michael & Saffer, Henry, 2004. "An economic analysis of adult obesity: results from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 565-587, May.
- Shin-Yi Chou & Michael Grossman & Henry Saffer, 2002. "An Economic Analysis of Adult Obesity: Results from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System," NBER Working Papers 9247, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Stephen T. Parente & David S. Salkever & Joan DaVanzo, 2005. "The role of consumer knowledge of insurance benefits in the demand for preventive health care among the elderly," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(1), pages 25-38.
- Viscusi, W Kip, 1984. "The Lulling Effect: The Impact of Child-Resistant Packaging on Aspirin and Analgesic Ingestions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 324-327, May. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)