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Are mental health insurance mandates effective? Evidence from suicides

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Jonathan Klick

    (Florida State University College of Law, USA)

  • Sara Markowitz

    (Rutgers University, Newark and National Bureau of Economic Research, USA)

Abstract

Many states in the US have passed laws mandating insurance companies to provide or offer some form of mental health benefits. These laws presumably lower the price of obtaining mental health services for many adults, and as a result, might improve health outcomes. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of mental health insurance mandates by examining the influence of mandates on adult suicides, which are strongly correlated with mental illness. Data on completed suicides in each state for the period 1981-2000 are analyzed. Ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares results show that mental health mandates are not effective in reducing suicide rates. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/hec.1023
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Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 15 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 83-97

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Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:15:y:2006:i:1:p:83-97
DOI: 10.1002/hec.1023
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/5749

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • I0 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - General
  • K0 - Law and Economics - - General

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  1. Joshua D. Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, 2001. "Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(4), pages 69-85, Fall.
  2. Gruber, J., 1992. "State Mandated Benefits and Employer Provided Health Insurance," Working papers 92-18, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  3. Michael Grossman, 1972. "The Demand for Health: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number gros72-1, October.
  4. Robert Kaestner & Kosali Ilayperuma Simon, 2002. "Labor Market Consequences of State Health Insurance Regulation," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(1), pages 136-159, October.
  5. Frank, Richard G. & McGuire, Thomas G., 2000. "Economics and mental health," Handbook of Health Economics,in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 893-954 Elsevier.
  6. Gruber, Jonathan, 1994. "State-mandated benefits and employer-provided health insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 433-464, November.
  7. Craig William Perry & Harvey S. Rosen, 2001. "The Self-Employed are Less Likely to Have Health Insurance Than Wage Earners. So What?," NBER Working Papers 8316, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by:

  1. Cseh Attila, 2008. "Labor Market Consequences of State Mental Health Parity Mandates," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 11(2), pages 1-34, April.
  2. Dhaval Dave & Swati Mukerjee, 2011. "Mental health parity legislation, cost‐sharing and substance‐abuse treatment admissions," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(2), pages 161-183, 02.
  3. Ettner, Susan L. & M. Harwood, Jessica & Thalmayer, Amber & Ong, Michael K. & Xu, Haiyong & Bresolin, Michael J. & Wells, Kenneth B. & Tseng, Chi-Hong & Azocar, Francisca, 2016. "The Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act evaluation study: Impact on specialty behavioral health utilization and expenditures among “carve-out” enrollees," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 131-143.
  4. Edwards, Griffin, 2013. "Tarasoff, duty to warn laws, and suicide," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 1-8.
  5. Griffin Edwards, 2014. "Doing Their Duty: An Empirical Analysis of the Unintended Effect of Tarasoff v. Regents on Homicidal Activity," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(2), pages 321-348.
  6. Marianne Bitler, 2005. "Effects of Increased Access to Infertility Treatment on Infant and Child Health Outcomes: Evidence from Health Insurance Mandates," PPIC Working Papers 2005.06, Public Policy Institute of California.
  7. Andersen, Martin, 2015. "Heterogeneity and the effect of mental health parity mandates on the labor market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 74-84.
  8. Yoon, Jangho, 2011. "Effect of increased private share of inpatient psychiatric resources on jail population growth: Evidence from the United States," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 72(4), pages 447-455, February.
  9. Joe Chen & Yun Jeong Choi & Kohta Mori & Yasuyuki Sawada & Saki Sugano, 2012. "Socio‐Economic Studies On Suicide: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 271-306, 04.
  10. Jinqi Ye, 2017. "The Effects of State and Federal Mental Health Parity Laws on Working Time," Center for Policy Research Working Papers 200, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
  11. Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, 2007. "Diabetes Treatments and Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 519-538.

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