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Asymmetry in information versus asymmetry in power: Implicit assumptions of agency theory?

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  • Saam, Nicole J.

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  • Saam, Nicole J., 2007. "Asymmetry in information versus asymmetry in power: Implicit assumptions of agency theory?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 825-840, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:36:y:2007:i:6:p:825-840
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Noel O'Sullivan, 2000. "The Determinants of Non-Executive Representation on the Boards of Large UK Companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 4(4), pages 283-297, December.
    2. Martens,Bertin & Mummert,Uwe & Murrell,Peter & Seabright,Paul, 2008. "The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521055390, April.
    3. Helen Short & Kevin Keasey & Darren Duxbury, 2002. "Capital Structure, Management Ownership and Large External Shareholders: A UK Analysis," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(3), pages 375-399.
    4. Wright, Peter & Mukherji, Ananda & Kroll, Mark J., 2001. "A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: extensions and extrapolations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 413-429.
    5. Hermalin, Benjamin E. & Wallace, Nancy E., 2001. "Firm performance and executive compensation in the savings and loan industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 139-170, July.
    6. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-359, March.
    7. Mike Wright & Robert E. Hoskisson & Lowell W. Busenitz & Jay Dial, 2001. "Finance and management buyouts: Agency versus entrepreneurship perspectives," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 239-261, July.
    8. Witt, Ulrich, 1998. "Imagination and leadership - The neglected dimension of an evolutionary theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 161-177, April.
    9. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    10. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1998. "Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1188-1206, December.
    11. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    12. Neil Longley, 1999. "Voting on Abortion in the House of Commons: A Test for Legislator Shirking," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 25(4), pages 503-521, December.
    13. Rees, Ray, 1985. "The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 2," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 75-95, May.
    14. Longley, Neil, 1998. "Legislative Systems with Absolute Party Discipline: Implications for the Agency Theory Approach to the Constituent-Legislator Link," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(1-2), pages 121-140, October.
    15. Ursula F. Ott, 2000. "International joint ventures: a common agency problem," Global Business and Economics Review, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 2(1), pages 67-84.
    16. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    17. Breton, Albert, 1995. "Organizational hierarchies and bureaucracies: An integrative essay," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 411-440, September.
    18. Chen, Jian, 2001. "Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 34(1-2), pages 53-72.
    19. Thomas N. Hubbard, 2000. "The Demand for Monitoring Technologies: The Case of Trucking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(2), pages 533-560.
    20. Rees, Ray, 1985. "The Theory of Principal and Agent: Part 1," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 3-26, January.
    21. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 2001. "Incentives and Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199248681.
    22. Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
    23. Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.
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    1. repec:eee:iburev:v:26:y:2017:i:6:p:1168-1183 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Fosu, Samuel & Danso, Albert & Ahmad, Wasim & Coffie, William, 2016. "Information asymmetry, leverage and firm value: Do crisis and growth matter?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 140-150.
    3. repec:eee:iburev:v:26:y:2017:i:3:p:461-475 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Annie Ng Cheng San & M. Krishna Moorthy & Choe Kum Lung, 2012. "Perceived Social Power and Audit Committee Effectiveness in Malaysia: The Conceptual Model," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 2(1), pages 162-175, January.

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