Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
This paper examines the cross-sectional relation between ownership structure and corporate performance of a sample of 434 manufacturing firms listed on the Chinese stock exchange. Following the agency theory and taking other influential factors into account, such as firm size, leverage ratio, variance of sales, growth of sale and firm age, the results suggest that there is a strong relation between ownership concentration and corporate performance, measured by Tobin's Q. A further classification of owners reveals that while shares held by state play a negative role in corporate governance, domestic institutional and managerial shareholdings improve the firms' performance. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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