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Une analyse théorique des fondements et du fonctionnement de la relation d'autorité intrafirme

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Listed:
  • Bernard Baudry

    (CALW - Centre Auguste et Léon Walras - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Bruno Tinel

    (MATISSE - UMR 8595 - Modélisation Appliquée, Trajectoires Institutionnelles et Stratégies Socio-Économiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

For about twenty years, the notion of authority has been put forward again into the analysis of employment relationship, especially concerning contracts incompleteness. This article has two purposes. First, it aims at giving an assessment of the famous controversy between Coase and Alchian-Demsetz through an analysis of the foundations of authority. Second, it is shown that the authority relationship inside the firm cannot only depend on a single variable. On the contrary, authorityrests upon a multiplicity of mechanisms. Employer's authority over employee has therefore to be understood in terms of degrees rather than in boolean terms.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Baudry & Bruno Tinel, 2003. "Une analyse théorique des fondements et du fonctionnement de la relation d'autorité intrafirme," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00270902, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00270902
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00270902
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Camille Chaserant, 2007. "Autorité et flexibilité : quand la théorie des options interroge," Working Papers hal-04139207, HAL.
    2. Bruno Tinel, 2005. "Remarques à propos du déterminisme technique," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r05069, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    3. Bruno Tinel, 2007. "Organisation sociale, fonctionnement economique et progrès technique. Le determinisme technique dans les "nouvelles" theories de l'entreprise," Post-Print halshs-00266026, HAL.
    4. Bruno Tinel, 2005. "Remarks on technical determinism [Remarques à propos du déterminisme technique]," Post-Print halshs-00196377, HAL.

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