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Autorité et flexibilité : quand la théorie des options interroge

Author

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  • Camille Chaserant

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Le contrat de travail institue la subordination du salarié à l'employeur. L'objet de cet article est de récuser l'assimilation faite par la littérature économique entre la subordination et l'autorité, définie depuis Simon (1951) comme la possibilité pour l'employeur de différer ses choix quant aux tâches du salarié. Nous proposons une relecture du modèle de Simon (1951) à partir du formalisme de la théorie des options financières, offrant ainsi un cadre unificateur aux modèles d'autorité, de flexibilité décisionnelle et de renégociation. Nous montrons que, en situation d'invérifiabilité sur les états de la nature, ce que Simon et la littérature qui s'en inspire nomment "contrat de travail" est un cas particulier de contrat de vente renégociable, analogue à un contrat spot couplé à la détention d'un portefeuille d'options d'achat sur les services offerts par le vendeur. Il ne formalise en rien le lien de subordination spécifique à la réalité du contrat de travail. La question économique de la subordination reste ouverte.

Suggested Citation

  • Camille Chaserant, 2007. "Autorité et flexibilité : quand la théorie des options interroge," Working Papers hal-04139207, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04139207
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04139207
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    References listed on IDEAS

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