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A cégek eredete
[The origin of the firm]

Author

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  • Lőrinczi, Gyula

    ()

Abstract

Az intézményi közgazdaságtan művelői és a tranzakciós költségek tanára építő mikroökonómiai megközelítés jegyében megalkotott elméleti modellek jelentős mértékben járultak hozzá a cégekkel kapcsolatos ismereteink bővítéséhez. Számos elemzés tárgyalta a cégek keretében folyó gazdasági tevékenység ökonómiai racionalitását a piacgazdaság keretei között. A cégek piaci viszonyok közötti működésének vizsgálata mint létező folyamatok tudományos eszközökkel való leírása, valamint a cégek születéséhez vezető folyamatok elemzése két külön téma. A cégek egyszerre gazdasági, jogi és történelmi képződmények, meghatározottságuk csak ebben a hármas kontextusban vizsgálható. Nem kaptunk még választ arra a kérdésre, milyen általános történelmi és speciális gazdasági körülmények vezettek ahhoz, hogy a cégek egyáltalán megjelentek az emberi tevékenység színpadán. Jelen munkában erre a kérdésre keressük a választ. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: K2, N00, O120, Z1.

Suggested Citation

  • Lőrinczi, Gyula, 2013. "A cégek eredete
    [The origin of the firm]
    ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(1), pages 25-46.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1357
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Joskow, Paul L, 1985. "Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 33-80, Spring.
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    4. Kapás, Judit, 2011. "Intézményi közgazdaságtan - két új Nobel díj-után. Beszámoló az ISNIE 2010. évi konferenciájáról - Stirling, 2010. június 17-19
      [Institutional economics - after two new Nobel prizes. Report on the
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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