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Residential mortgage default: Theory works and so does policy

  • Goodman, Allen C.
  • Smith, Brent C.
Registered author(s):

    Using a national loan level data set we examine loan default as explained by local demographic characteristics and state level legislation that regulates foreclosure procedures and predatory lending, using a hierarchical linear model. When controlling for loan and local conditions, we observe significant variation in the default rate across states, with lower default levels in states with higher temporal and financial costs to lenders. State level legislative influences provide a foundation for discussion of national level policy that further regulates predatory lending and financial institution foreclosure activities.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJR-515SRFK-1/2/647cde3b141d9d4af5f47f04b8e30682
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Housing Economics.

    Volume (Year): 19 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 4 (December)
    Pages: 280-294

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:19:y:2010:i:4:p:280-294
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622881

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    25. Bostic, Raphael W. & Engel, Kathleen C. & McCoy, Patricia A. & Pennington-Cross, Anthony & Wachter, Susan M., 2008. "State and local anti-predatory lending laws: The effect of legal enforcement mechanisms," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(1-2), pages 47-66.
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