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Vulnerability game

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  • Charness, Gary
  • Caporale, Diana
  • Rinaldi, Anna

Abstract

The resilience of communities to natural disasters depends on mitigation actions, which can be undertaken by public institutions, communities, or individual citizens. However, in disaster-prone areas, trust is often lacking—not only in institutions but also among neighbors, hindering the implementation of collective mitigation strategies.

Suggested Citation

  • Charness, Gary & Caporale, Diana & Rinaldi, Anna, 2026. "Vulnerability game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 241(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:241:y:2026:i:c:s0167268125004585
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107341
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • H84 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Disaster Aid

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