IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/expeco/v10y2007i3p251-267.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game

Author

Listed:
  • Timothy Cason
  • Vai-Lam Mui

Abstract

This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of non-binding communication among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary to the predictions of analysis based on purely self-regarding preferences, we find that non-binding communication about intended resistance increases the incidence of no transgression even in the one-shot laboratory CR game. In particular, we find that the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no communication up to 25-37 percent depending on whether communication occurs before or after the leader’s transgression decision. Responders’ messages are different when the leaders can observe them, and the leaders use the observed messages to target specific responders for transgression.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 2007. "Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(3), pages 251-267, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:3:p:251-267
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-007-9181-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-007-9181-1
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10683-007-9181-1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Third Party Punishment and Social Norms," IEW - Working Papers 106, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Charness, Gary & Rabin, Matthew, 2001. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt4qz9k8vg, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    3. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    4. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    5. Timothy N Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 2008. "Coordinating Collective Resistance Through Communication And Repeated Interaction," Monash Economics Working Papers 16/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    6. Battalio, Raymond & Samuelson, Larry & Van Huyck, John, 2001. "Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 749-764, May.
    7. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises and Partnership," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November.
    8. Weingast, Barry R., 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 245-263, June.
    9. David J. Cooper & John H. Kagel, 2005. "Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 477-509, June.
    10. Barry R. Weingast, 2005. "The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 89-108, Summer.
    11. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2003. "Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule," NBER Working Papers 10136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 2002. "Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(3), pages 817-869.
    13. Weingast, Barry R, 1995. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 1-31, April.
    14. Miller,Gary J., 1992. "Managerial Dilemmas," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521372817, September.
    15. Ronald Bosman & Frans van Winden, 2002. "Emotional Hazard in a Power-to-take Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 147-169, January.
    16. Van Huyck John B. & Battalio Raymond C. & Walters Mary F., 1995. "Commitment versus Discretion in the Peasant-Dictator Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 143-170, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Klaus Abbink & David Masclet & Daniel Mirza, 2018. "Inequality and inter-group conflicts: experimental evidence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(3), pages 387-423, March.
    2. James Bland & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2013. "Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_19, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    3. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2012. "Transparency, complementarity and holdout," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 598-612.
    4. Daniel Houser & Erte Xiao, 2011. "Classification of natural language messages using a coordination game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(1), pages 1-14, March.
    5. M. Bigoni & S. Bortolotti & M. Casari & D. Gambetta, 2012. "Trustworthy by Convention," Working Papers wp827, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    6. Cason, Timothy N. & Mui, Vai-Lam, 2015. "Rich communication, social motivations, and coordinated resistance against divide-and-conquer: A laboratory investigation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 146-159.
    7. W. Bentley MacLeod & Victoria Valle Lara & Christian Zehnder, 2020. "Worker Empowerment and Subjective Evaluation: On Building an Effective Conflict Culture," NBER Working Papers 27857, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2020. "Managerial Leadership, Truth-Telling, and Efficient Coordination," Working Papers 1211, Barcelona School of Economics.
    9. Bland, James & Nikiforakis, Nikos, 2015. "Coordination with third-party externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1-15.
    10. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2018. "Truth Be Told An Experimental Study of Communication and Centralization," Working Papers 1046, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Abbink, Klaus & Doğan, Gönül, 2019. "How to choose your victim," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 482-496.
    12. Timothy N Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, 2008. "Coordinating Collective Resistance Through Communication And Repeated Interaction," Monash Economics Working Papers 16/08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    13. Tebbe, Eva & Wegener, Benjamin, 2022. "Is natural language processing the cheap charlie of analyzing cheap talk? A horse race between classifiers on experimental communication data," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    14. Bigoni, Maria & Bortolotti, Stefania & Casari, Marco & Gambetta, Diego, 2013. "It takes two to cheat: An experiment on derived trust," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 129-146.
    15. Raimo P. Hämäläinen & Ilkka Leppänen, 2017. "Cheap talk and cooperation in Stackelberg games," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 25(2), pages 261-285, June.
    16. Felix Albrecht & Björn Frank & Simone Gobien & Maren Hartmann & Özcan Ihtiyar & Elina Khachatryan & Nataliya Kusa & Ahmed Rashad & Mohamed Ismail Sabry & Sondos Shaheen & Thomas Stöber, 2016. "The Powerful, the Powerless, and the Grabbing: Non-Nash Land Grabbing in the Lab," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 219-242, October.
    17. Christoph March & Robert K. Weizsäcker, 2020. "Coordinating intergenerational redistribution and the repayment of public debt: an experimental test of Tabellini (1991)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(2), pages 301-323, August.
    18. Christoph March & Robert K. von Weizsäcker & Robert K. von Weizsäcker, 2016. "Coordinating Intergenerational Redistribution and the Repayment of Public Debt," CESifo Working Paper Series 6075, CESifo.
    19. Bhattacharya, Puja, 2016. "Inter-team contests with power differential," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 157-175.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fluet, Claude & Galbiati, Rpbertp, 2016. "Lois et normes : les enseignements de l'économie comportementale," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 92(1-2), pages 191-215, Mars-Juin.
    2. Charness, Gary & Schram, Arthur, 2012. "Social and Moral Norms in the Laboratory," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt6rv7x0tf, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    3. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2023. "Guilt aversion in (new) games: Does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 690-717.
    4. Sutter, Matthias & Czermak, Simon & Feri, Francesco, 2010. "Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games," Working Papers in Economics 430, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    5. James Andreoni, 2018. "Satisfaction Guaranteed: When Moral Hazard Meets Moral Preferences," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 159-189, November.
    6. Arthur Schram & Gary Charness, 2015. "Inducing Social Norms in Laboratory Allocation Choices," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(7), pages 1531-1546, July.
    7. Natalia Montinari & Antonio Nicolò & Regine Oexl, 2016. "The gift of being chosen," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(2), pages 460-479, June.
    8. Sutter, Matthias & Czermak, Simon & Feri, Francesco, 2013. "Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams. Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 395-410.
    9. Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2015. "The geometry of distributional preferences and a non-parametric identification approach: The Equality Equivalence Test," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 85-103.
    10. Charness, Gary & Schram, Arthur, 2013. "Social and Moral Norms in Allocation Choices in the Laboratory," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt0t39x0pt, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    11. Rudolf Kerschbamer, 2013. "The Geometry of Distributional Preferences and a Non-Parametric Identification Approach," Working Papers 2013-25, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    12. Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2016. "Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 235-273, June.
    13. Tetsuo Yamamori & Kazuyuki Iwata, 2023. "Wage claim detracts reciprocity in labor relations: experimental study of gift exchange games," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 18(3), pages 573-597, July.
    14. Jiabin Wu, 2018. "Indirect higher order beliefs and cooperation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(4), pages 858-876, December.
    15. Matthias Sutter & Francesco Feri & Martin G. Kocher & Peter Martinsson & Katarina Nordblom & Daniela Rützler, 2010. "Social preferences in childhood and adolescence - A large-scale experiment," Working Papers 2010-13, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    16. Cason, Timothy N. & Mui, Vai-Lam, 2015. "Rich communication, social motivations, and coordinated resistance against divide-and-conquer: A laboratory investigation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 146-159.
    17. Attanasi, Giuseppe & Rimbaud, Claire & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Embezzlement and guilt aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 409-429.
    18. Daniel Woods & Maroš Servátka, 2019. "Nice to you, nicer to me: Does self-serving generosity diminish the reciprocal response?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 506-529, June.
    19. Barmettler, Franziska & Fehr, Ernst & Zehnder, Christian, 2012. "Big experimenter is watching you! Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 17-34.
    20. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González, 2011. "Don't Ask Me If You Will Not Listen: The Dilemma of Participative Decision Making," Working Papers 11-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Communication; Cheap talk; Collective resistance; Laboratory experiment; Social preferences; C92; D74;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:10:y:2007:i:3:p:251-267. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.