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Vertical integration and collusive incentives: an experimental analysis

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  • Mason, Charles F.
  • Phillips, Owen R.

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  • Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 2000. "Vertical integration and collusive incentives: an experimental analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 471-496, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:18:y:2000:i:3:p:471-496
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    1. Keith J. Crocker, 1983. "Vertical Integration and the Strategic use of Private Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 236-250, Spring.
    2. Waterson, Michael, 1993. "Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 9(2), pages 41-57, Summer.
    3. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    4. Dan Alger, 1987. "Laboratory Tests of Equilibrium Predictions with Disequilibrium Data," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(1), pages 105-145.
    5. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 259-327, Elsevier.
    6. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
    7. Carlton, Dennis W, 1979. "Vertical Integration in Competitive Markets under Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 189-209, March.
    8. Jacobs, Rodney L & Leamer, Edward E & Ward, Michael P, 1979. "Difficulties with Testing for Causation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(3), pages 401-413, July.
    9. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-265, March.
    10. Mason, Charles F & Phillips, Owen R & Nowell, Clifford, 1992. "Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets: An Experimental Evaluation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(4), pages 662-670, November.
    11. Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, 1985. "Dealer and Manufacturer Margins," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 253-268, Summer.
    12. Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Van Long, 1996. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, September.
    13. Plott, Charles R., 1989. "An updated review of industrial organization: Applications of experimental methods," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 1109-1176, Elsevier.
    14. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    15. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    16. Greenhut, M L & Ohta, H, 1979. "Vertical Integration of Successive Oligopolists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 137-141, March.
    17. Gal-Or, Esther, 1992. "Vertical Integration in Oligopoly," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 377-393, April.
    18. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    19. Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, 1992. "Mutual Forbearance in Experimental Conglomerate Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 395-414, Autumn.
    20. Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, 1996. "Market Regulation and Multimarket Rivalry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 596-617, Autumn.
    21. Leonard Shapiro, 1980. "Decentralized Dynamics in Duopoly with Pareto Optimal Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 730-744, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Hutzschenreuter & Florian Gröne, 2009. "Changing Vertical Integration Strategies under Pressure from Foreign Competition: The Case of US and German Multinationals," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 269-307, March.
    2. Charles F. Mason & Owen R. Phillips, 2016. "Imminent Entry and the Transition to Multimarket Rivalry in a Laboratory Setting," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 1018-1039, December.
    3. Moellers, Claudia & Normann, Hans-Theo & Snyder, Christopher M., 2017. "Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 214-258.
    4. Barbot, Cristina, 2009. "Airport and airlines competition: Incentives for vertical collusion," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 43(10), pages 952-965, December.
    5. Bello, Alejandro & Huerta, Emilio, 2007. "Regulation and market power in the Spanish liquefied petroleum gas industry: Progress or failure?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 3595-3605, July.
    6. Junho Yang & Tetsuya Kawamura & Kazuhito Ogawa, 2016. "Experimental Multimarket Contact Inhibits Cooperation," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 21-43, February.
    7. Elliott, Steven R. & Godby, Robert & Kruse, Jamie Brown, 2003. "An experimental examination of vertical control and cost predation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 253-281, February.
    8. Nicolas Pasquier & Olivier Bonroy & Alexis Garapin, 2022. "Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(4), pages 585-614, November.
    9. Möllers, Claudia, 2016. "Reputation and foreclosure with vertical integration: Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 232, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    10. Normann, Hans-Theo & Möllers, Claudia & Snyder, Christopher M., 2015. "Communication in Vertically Related Markets: Experimental Evidence," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112842, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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