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Vertical integration and collusive incentives: an experimental analysis

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  • Mason, Charles F.
  • Phillips, Owen R.

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  • Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 2000. "Vertical integration and collusive incentives: an experimental analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 471-496, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:18:y:2000:i:3:p:471-496
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
    2. Keith J. Crocker, 1983. "Vertical Integration and the Strategic use of Private Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 236-250, Spring.
    3. Greenhut, M L & Ohta, H, 1979. "Vertical Integration of Successive Oligopolists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 137-141, March.
    4. Waterson, Michael, 1993. "Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 41-57, Summer.
    5. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 259-327 Elsevier.
    6. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-1045, September.
    7. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    8. Dan Alger, 1987. "Laboratory Tests of Equilibrium Predictions with Disequilibrium Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 105-145.
    9. Gal-Or, Esther, 1992. "Vertical Integration in Oligopoly," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 377-393, April.
    10. Carlton, Dennis W, 1979. "Vertical Integration in Competitive Markets under Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 189-209, March.
    11. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    12. Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Long, 1996. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, September.
    13. Jacobs, Rodney L & Leamer, Edward E & Ward, Michael P, 1979. "Difficulties with Testing for Causation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(3), pages 401-413, July.
    14. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-265, March.
    15. Mason, Charles F & Phillips, Owen R & Nowell, Clifford, 1992. "Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets: An Experimental Evaluation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(4), pages 662-670, November.
    16. Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, 1992. "Mutual Forbearance in Experimental Conglomerate Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 395-414, Autumn.
    17. Plott, Charles R., 1989. "An updated review of industrial organization: Applications of experimental methods," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 1109-1176 Elsevier.
    18. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-147, Supplemen.
    19. Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, 1996. "Market Regulation and Multimarket Rivalry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 596-617, Autumn.
    20. Leonard Shapiro, 1980. "Decentralized Dynamics in Duopoly with Pareto Optimal Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 730-744, Autumn.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Charles F. Mason & Owen R. Phillips, 2016. "Imminent Entry and the Transition to Multimarket Rivalry in a Laboratory Setting," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 1018-1039, December.
    2. Möllers, Claudia, 2016. "Reputation and foreclosure with vertical integration: Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 232, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    3. Junho Yang & Tetsuya Kawamura & Kazuhito Ogawa, 2016. "Experimental Multimarket Contact Inhibits Cooperation," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 21-43, February.
    4. Normann, Hans-Theo & Möllers, Claudia & Snyder, Christopher M., 2015. "Communication in Vertically Related Markets: Experimental Evidence," Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112842, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Thomas Hutzschenreuter & Florian Gröne, 2009. "Changing Vertical Integration Strategies under Pressure from Foreign Competition: The Case of US and German Multinationals," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 269-307, March.
    6. Moellers, Claudia & Normann, Hans-Theo & Snyder, Christopher M., 2017. "Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 214-258.
    7. Barbot, Cristina, 2009. "Airport and airlines competition: Incentives for vertical collusion," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 43(10), pages 952-965, December.
    8. Elliott, Steven R. & Godby, Robert & Kruse, Jamie Brown, 2003. "An experimental examination of vertical control and cost predation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 253-281, February.
    9. Bello, Alejandro & Huerta, Emilio, 2007. "Regulation and market power in the Spanish liquefied petroleum gas industry: Progress or failure?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 3595-3605, July.

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