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Vertical integration and collusive incentives: an experimental analysis

  • Mason, Charles F.
  • Phillips, Owen R.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Journal of Industrial Organization.

Volume (Year): 18 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
Pages: 471-496

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Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:18:y:2000:i:3:p:471-496
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505551

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  1. Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole., 1986. "Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview," Economics Working Papers 8613, University of California at Berkeley.
  2. Greenhut, M L & Ohta, H, 1979. "Vertical Integration of Successive Oligopolists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(1), pages 137-41, March.
  3. Mason, Charles F & Phillips, Owen R & Nowell, Clifford, 1992. "Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets: An Experimental Evaluation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(4), pages 662-70, November.
  4. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
  5. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, June.
  6. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
  7. Géarard Gaudet & Ngo Long, 1996. "Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 409-432, 09.
  8. Keith J. Crocker, 1983. "Vertical Integration and the Strategic use of Private Information," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 236-250, Spring.
  9. Carlton, Dennis W, 1979. "Vertical Integration in Competitive Markets under Uncertainty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 189-209, March.
  10. Kalai, Ehud & Lehrer, Ehud, 1993. "Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1019-45, September.
  11. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-65, March.
  12. Dan Alger, 1987. "Laboratory Tests of Equilibrium Predictions with Disequilibrium Data," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 54(1), pages 105-145.
  13. Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, 1996. "Market Regulation and Multimarket Rivalry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 596-617, Autumn.
  14. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
  15. Leonard Shapiro, 1980. "Decentralized Dynamics in Duopoly with Pareto Optimal Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 730-744, Autumn.
  16. Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, 1992. "Mutual Forbearance in Experimental Conglomerate Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(3), pages 395-414, Autumn.
  17. Waterson, Michael, 1993. "Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 41-57, Summer.
  18. Jacobs, Rodney L & Leamer, Edward E & Ward, Michael P, 1979. "Difficulties with Testing for Causation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(3), pages 401-13, July.
  19. Gal-Or, Esther, 1992. "Vertical Integration in Oligopoly," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 377-93, April.
  20. Plott, Charles R., 1989. "An updated review of industrial organization: Applications of experimental methods," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 1109-1176 Elsevier.
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