IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-04894528.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Two-part tariff, demand uncertainty and double marginalization: An experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Olivier Bonroy

    (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes)

  • Alexis Garapin

    (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes)

  • Nicolas Pasquier

    (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes)

Abstract

In an uncertain demand environment, the per-unit price of a two-part tariff can have insurance properties, insofar as it transfers risk from risk-averse downstream firms to less risk averse upstream firms, and compensation properties insofar as it compensates downstream firms for lessened attractiveness of trade. Both properties have opposite effects such as the first one can increase double marginalization and the second one can mitigate it. This paper provides experimental evidence of both properties.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Bonroy & Alexis Garapin & Nicolas Pasquier, 2025. "Two-part tariff, demand uncertainty and double marginalization: An experiment," Post-Print hal-04894528, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04894528
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112171
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio, 2018. "Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 465-483.
    2. Gaudin, Germain, 2016. "Pass-through, vertical contracts, and bargains," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 1-4.
    3. Marco Pagnozzi & Salvatore Piccolo, 2012. "Vertical Separation with Private Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(559), pages 173-207, March.
    4. Nicolas Pasquier & Olivier Bonroy & Alexis Garapin, 2022. "Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(4), pages 585-614, November.
    5. March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2018. "Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 114-131.
    6. Jordi Brandts & Jan Potters, 2018. "Experimental industrial organization," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 17, pages 453-474, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Moellers, Claudia & Normann, Hans-Theo & Snyder, Christopher M., 2017. "Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 214-258.
    8. Joseph J. Spengler, 1950. "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4), pages 347-347.
    9. Durham, Yvonne, 2000. "An experimental examination of double marginalization and vertical relationships," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 207-229, June.
    10. Martin, Stephen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Snyder, Christopher M, 2001. "Vertical Foreclosure in Experimental Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 466-496, Autumn.
    11. Daniel L. Chen & Martin Schonger & Chris Wickens, 2016. "oTree - An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments," Post-Print hal-04315125, HAL.
    12. Soheil Ghili & Matt Schmitt, 2024. "Risk Aversion and Double Marginalization," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 762-806, June.
    13. Chen, Daniel L. & Schonger, Martin & Wickens, Chris, 2016. "oTree—An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(C), pages 88-97.
    14. Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "The Logic of Vertical Restraints," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 921-939, December.
    15. Nicolas Pasquier & Olivier Bonroy & Alexis Garapin, 2022. "Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment," Post-Print hal-03604049, HAL.
    16. Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 2000. "Vertical integration and collusive incentives: an experimental analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 471-496, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nicolas Pasquier & Olivier Bonroy & Alexis Garapin, 2022. "Risk aversion and equilibrium selection in a vertical contracting setting: an experiment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(4), pages 585-614, November.
    2. Moellers, Claudia & Normann, Hans-Theo & Snyder, Christopher M., 2017. "Communication in vertical markets: Experimental evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 214-258.
    3. Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio, 2018. "Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 465-483.
    4. Janssen, Maarten C.W., 2020. "Vertical contracts in search markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    5. Chrysovalantou Milliou & Apostolis Pavlou, 2020. "Foreign direct investment in vertically related markets," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 284-320, February.
    6. Normann, Hans-Theo & Möllers, Claudia & Snyder, Christopher M., 2015. "Communication in Vertically Related Markets: Experimental Evidence," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112842, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Brenøe, Anne Ardila & Eyibak, Zeynep & Heursen, Lea & Ranehill, Eva & Weber, Roberto A., 2024. "Gender Identity and Economic Decision Making," IZA Discussion Papers 17564, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Grosch, Kerstin & Fischer, Sabine, 2024. "Gender equivalence in overconfidence A large-scale experimental study in a non-WEIRD country," Department for Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Series 02/2024, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    9. Luong, Phat V. & Xu, Xiaowei, 2020. "Pass-through of commodity price shocks in distribution channels with risk-averse agents," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    10. Xulia González, 2015. "Empirical Regularities in the Vertical Restraints of Manuacturing Firms," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 43(2), pages 181-194, June.
    11. Rutledge, Robert M. & Alladi, Vinayak & Cheung, Stephen L., 2025. "Price expectations and reference-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    12. Teck-Hua Ho & Juanjuan Zhang, 2008. "Designing Pricing Contracts for Boundedly Rational Customers: Does the Framing of the Fixed Fee Matter?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(4), pages 686-700, April.
    13. Mathieu Chevrier & Vincent Teixeira, 2024. "Algorithm Delegation and Responsibility: Shifting Blame to the Programmer?," GREDEG Working Papers 2024-04, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Sep 2024.
    14. Hikmet Gunay & Ricardo Huamán-Aguilar, 2024. "Experiments on the Different Numbers of Bidders in Sequential Auctions," Documentos de Trabajo / Working Papers 2024-530, Departamento de Economía - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.
    15. Lømo, Teis Lunde, 2015. "Risk sharing mitigates opportunism in vertical contracting," Working Papers in Economics 10/15, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
    16. Yang, Luhe & Ning, Yongpeng & Zhang, Lianzhong, 2025. "Reconstruction of micro-dynamics characterizing human decision-making behavior in repeated social dilemmas," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 497(C).
    17. Ockenfels, Axel & Gallier, Carlo & Sturm, Bodo, 2024. "More frequent commitments promote cooperation, ratcheting does not," ZEW Discussion Papers 24-065, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    18. Marie-Laure Allain & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2006. "Retail structure and product variety," Working Papers hal-00243032, HAL.
    19. repec:osf:osfxxx:964ba_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. repec:osf:osfxxx:b5682_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. repec:rnp:ecopol:ep1440 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Duffy, John & Rabanal, Jean Paul & Rud, Olga A., 2023. "Market reactions to stock splits: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 214(C), pages 325-345.
    23. Giorgio Zanarone, 2009. "Vertical Restraints and the Law: Evidence from Automobile Franchising," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(4), pages 691-700, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-part tariff; Vertical relationship; Demand uncertainty; Risk aversion; Double marginalization; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04894528. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.