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Market Regulation and Multimarket Rivalry

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  • Owen R. Phillips
  • Charles F. Mason

Abstract

Multimarket contact between duopolists in an X and Y market is modelled with a trigger strategy. We show that mildly restrictive price-cap regulation in the X market decreases Y market quantities; but restrictive caps in the X market have a positive impact on Y market outputs. Behavior in laboratory markets confirms these propositions. Regulation that lowers X market prices by a small amount results in a statistically significant reduction in Y outputs. When the regulated X market price is reduced to the Cournot/Nash level, Y market outputs rise to a point statistically indistinguishable from the unregulated quantities.

Suggested Citation

  • Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, 1996. "Market Regulation and Multimarket Rivalry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 596-617, Autumn.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:27:y:1996:i:autumn:p:596-617
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    Cited by:

    1. Ahmed, Rasha & Segerson, Kathleen, 2011. "Collective voluntary agreements to eliminate polluting products," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 572-588, September.
    2. Leopold Soegner, 1998. "Regulation of a Complementary Imputed Good in a Competitive Environment," Department of Economics Working Papers wuwp056, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    3. Roques, F.A. & Savva , N.S., 2006. "Price Cap Regulation and Investment Incentives under Demand Uncertainty," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0636, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Sögner, Leopold, 1998. "Regulation of a complementary imputed good in an competitive environment," Department of Economics Working Paper Series 128, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business.
    5. J. Hinloopen, 2003. "Cartel Stability with Time-dependent Detection Probabilities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 03-104/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Charles F. Mason & Owen R. Phillips, 2016. "Imminent Entry and the Transition to Multimarket Rivalry in a Laboratory Setting," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(4), pages 1018-1039, December.
    7. Lucio Fuentelsaz & Jaime Gómez, "undated". "Multipoint Competition, Mutual Forbearance and Entry into Geographic Markets," Studies on the Spanish Economy 127, FEDEA.
    8. Azar Ofer H, 2003. "Can Price Discrimination be Bad for Firms and Good for All Consumers? A Theoretical Analysis of Cross-Market Price Constraints with Entry and Product Differentiation," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-19, September.
    9. Daniel Cracau & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 2014. "The Divergent Effects of Long-Term and Short-Term Entry Investments on Home Market Cartels," FEMM Working Papers 140003, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    10. Mason, Charles F. & Phillips, Owen R., 2000. "Vertical integration and collusive incentives: an experimental analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 471-496, April.
    11. Eric W. Bond & Constantinos Syropoulos, 2008. "Trade costs and multimarket collusion," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 1080-1104, December.
    12. Lasse B. Lien & Peter G. Klein, 2013. "Can the Survivor Principle Survive Diversification?," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(5), pages 1478-1494, October.
    13. Hinloopen, Jeroen, 2006. "Internal cartel stability with time-dependent detection probabilities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1213-1229, November.
    14. Roques, Fabien A. & Savva, Nicos, 2009. "Investment under uncertainty with price ceilings in oligopolies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 507-524, February.

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