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International Business Research and Game Theory: Looking beyond the Prisoner's Dilemma

  • Ott, Ursula F.
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    This article outlines the un-mined potential of Game Theory for International Business (IB) research. Game Theory has been only rarely used in International Business – particularly, in comparison to transaction cost economics and the resource based view. Although its applications to International Business problems do exist, there is considerably more potential for its refinements to be related to topics of uncertainty and dynamics in strategic interactions in International Business. There is more to Game Theory than the Prisoner's Dilemma.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0969593112000960
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Business Review.

    Volume (Year): 22 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 480-491

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:iburev:v:22:y:2013:i:2:p:480-491
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