IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/hepoli/v108y2012i2p140-148.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in primary care: An explanatory study among French general practitioners

Author

Listed:
  • Sicsic, Jonathan
  • Le Vaillant, Marc
  • Franc, Carine

Abstract

Like many other OECD nations, France has implemented a pay-for-performance (P4P) model in primary care. However, the benefits have been debated, particularly regarding the possibly undesirable effects of extrinsic motivation (EM) on intrinsic motivation (IM).

Suggested Citation

  • Sicsic, Jonathan & Le Vaillant, Marc & Franc, Carine, 2012. "Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations in primary care: An explanatory study among French general practitioners," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 140-148.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:108:y:2012:i:2:p:140-148
    DOI: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2012.08.020
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168851012002436
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.healthpol.2012.08.020?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pelletier-Fleury, Nathalie & Le Vaillant, Marc & Hebbrecht, Gilles & Boisnault, Philippe, 2007. "Determinants of preventive services in general practice: A multilevel approach in cardiovascular domain and vaccination in France," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(2-3), pages 218-227, May.
    2. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
    3. Gene-Badia, Joan & Escaramis-Babiano, Georgia & Sans-Corrales, Mireia & Sampietro-Colom, Laura & Aguado-Menguy, Francoise & Cabezas-Pena, Carmen & Puelles, Pedro Gallo de, 2007. "Impact of economic incentives on quality of professional life and on end-user satisfaction in primary care," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 2-10, January.
    4. Bruno S. Frey, 1997. "Not Just for the Money," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1183.
    5. Yann Videau & Philippe Batifoulier & Y Arrighi & Maryse Gadreau & Bruno Ventelou, 2010. "Le cycle de vie des motivations professionnelles en médecine de ville : une étude dans le champ de la prévention," Post-Print halshs-01228541, HAL.
    6. Duncan, Craig & Jones, Kelvyn & Moon, Graham, 1998. "Context, composition and heterogeneity: Using multilevel models in health research," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 97-117, January.
    7. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    8. Hughes, David, 1993. "General practitioners and the new contract: promoting better health through financial incentives," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 39-50, September.
    9. repec:bla:kyklos:v:54:y:2001:i:2-3:p:317-42 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Jinhu Li & Jeremiah Hurley & Philip DeCicca & Gioia Buckley, 2014. "Physician Response To Pay‐For‐Performance: Evidence From A Natural Experiment," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(8), pages 962-978, August.
    11. Croxson, B. & Propper, C. & Perkins, A., 2001. "Do doctors respond to financial incentives? UK family doctors and the GP fundholder scheme," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 375-398, February.
    12. Siegwart Lindenberg, 2001. "Intrinsic Motivation in a New Light," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2‐3), pages 317-342, May.
    13. James, Harvey Jr., 2005. "Why did you do that? An economic examination of the effect of extrinsic compensation on intrinsic motivation and performance," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 549-566, August.
    14. Nigel Rice & Andrew Jones, 1997. "Multilevel models and health economics," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 6(6), pages 561-575, November.
    15. Kreps, David M, 1997. "Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 359-364, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Peter Zweifel & Katharina Janus, 2017. "Medical ethics: enhanced or undermined by modes of payment?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 18(1), pages 119-129, January.
    2. Claudia Keser & Emmanuel Peterlé & Cornelius Schnitzler, 2014. "Money talks - Paying physicians for performance," CIRANO Working Papers 2014s-41, CIRANO.
    3. Allen, Thomas & Whittaker, William & Sutton, Matt, 2017. "Does the proportion of pay linked to performance affect the job satisfaction of general practitioners?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 9-17.
    4. Olivier Saint-Lary & Erik Bernard & Jonathan Sicsic & Isabelle Plu & Irène François-Purssell & Carine Franc, 2013. "Why Did Most French GPs Choose Not to Join the Voluntary National Pay-for-Performance Program?," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 8(9), pages 1-7, September.
    5. Jonathan Sicsic & Carine Franc, 2017. "Impact assessment of a pay-for-performance program on breast cancer screening in France using micro data," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 18(5), pages 609-621, June.
    6. Saint-Lary, Olivier & Sicsic, Jonathan, 2015. "Impact of a pay for performance programme on French GPs’ consultation length," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 119(4), pages 417-426.
    7. Pedersen, Line Bjørnskov & Andersen, Merethe Kirstine Kousgaard & Jensen, Ulrich Thy & Waldorff, Frans Boch & Jacobsen, Christian Bøtcher, 2018. "Can external interventions crowd in intrinsic motivation? A cluster randomised field experiment on mandatory accreditation of general practice in Denmark," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 211(C), pages 224-233.
    8. Zweifel, Peter & Janus, Katharina, 2016. "Physician ethics: undermined or enhanced by modes of payment?," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145708, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    9. Sicsic, Jonathan & Krucien, Nicolas & Franc, Carine, 2016. "What are GPs' preferences for financial and non-financial incentives in cancer screening? Evidence for breast, cervical, and colorectal cancers," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 116-127.
    10. Zweifel, Peter, 2021. "Innovation in health care through information technology (IT): The role of incentives," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 289(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Belenzon, Sharon & Schankerman, Mark, 2008. "Motivation and sorting in open source software innovation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51594, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Jeanne Lievaut & Philippe Batifoulier, 2011. "La transformation des actes gratuits en actes payants en médecine libérale. Une étude micro-économétrique longitudinale," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-12, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    3. Philippe Batifoulier & Maryse Gadreau & Yves Arrighi & Yann Videau & Bruno Ventelou, 2009. "Disentangling extrinsic and intrinsic motivations: the case of French GPs dealing with prevention," EconomiX Working Papers 2009-15, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    4. Stanca, Luca & Bruni, Luigino & Corazzini, Luca, 2009. "Testing theories of reciprocity: Do motivations matter?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 233-245, August.
    5. Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Corporate Governance for Crooks? The Case for Corporate Virtue," IEW - Working Papers 164, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    6. McCausland, David & Pouliakas, Konstantinos & Theodossiou, Ioannis, 2005. "Some are Punished and Some are Rewarded: A Study of the Impact of Performance Pay on Job Satisfaction," MPRA Paper 14243, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Maria Cotofan, 2019. "Learning from Praise: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Teachers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-082/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Dirk Sliwka, 2007. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 999-1012, June.
    9. Mousquès, Julien & Renaud, Thomas & Scemama, Olivier, 2010. "Is the "practice style" hypothesis relevant for general practitioners? An analysis of antibiotics prescription for acute rhinopharyngitis," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 70(8), pages 1176-1184, April.
    10. Joan Esteban & Laurence Kranich, 2003. "The Social Contracts with Endogenous Sentiments," Working Papers 71, Barcelona School of Economics.
    11. Phu Nguyen Van & Thierry Blayac & Dimitri Dubois & Sebastien Duchene & Marc Willinger & Bruno Ventelou, 2021. "Designing acceptable anti-COVID-19 policies by taking into account individuals’ preferences: evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment," EconomiX Working Papers 2021-33, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    12. Natalie Gold, 2019. "The limits of commodification arguments: Framing, motivation crowding, and shared valuations," Politics, Philosophy & Economics, , vol. 18(2), pages 165-192, May.
    13. Patrizia Lattarulo & Marco Mariani & Laura Razzolini, 2017. "Nudging museums attendance: a field experiment with high school teens," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 41(3), pages 259-277, August.
    14. Konstantinos Pouliakas, 2010. "Pay Enough, Don't Pay Too Much or Don't Pay at All? The Impact of Bonus Intensity on Job Satisfaction," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(4), pages 597-626, November.
    15. Bruno S. Frey & Margit Osterloh, "undated". "Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats," IEW - Working Papers 187, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    16. Junichiro Ishida, 2011. "Autonomy and Motivation: A Dual-Self Perspective," ISER Discussion Paper 0803, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    17. Luca Stanca, Luigino Bruni, Luca Corazzini, 2007. "Testing Theories of Reciprocity: Does Motivation Matter?," ISLA Working Papers 29, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    18. Luca Stanca & Luigino Bruni & Marco Mantovani, 2011. "The effect of motivations on social indirect reciprocity: an experimental analysis," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(17), pages 1709-1711.
    19. Sliwka, Dirk, 2003. "On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," IZA Discussion Papers 844, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    20. Allen, Thomas & Whittaker, William & Sutton, Matt, 2017. "Does the proportion of pay linked to performance affect the job satisfaction of general practitioners?," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 9-17.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    General practitioners; Intrinsic motivation; Extrinsic motivation; Payment for performance; Multiple correspondence analysis; Multilevel analysis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:hepoli:v:108:y:2012:i:2:p:140-148. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu or the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/healthpol .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.