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La transformation des actes gratuits en actes payants en médecine libérale. Une étude micro-économétrique longitudinale

Author

Listed:
  • Jeanne Lievaut

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Philippe Batifoulier

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Cet article s'intéresse aux actes médicaux qui sont « donnés » aux patients sans contrepartie pécuniaire. Dans la littérature en économie de la santé, les actes gratuits sont associés à une forme extrême d'altruisme médical. La discrimination par les prix exprime la sensibilité du médecin à un type particulier de patient. Notre analyse économétrique (8002 médecins libéraux observés durant la période 1979-2000) permet de tester une autre hypothèse, selon laquelle la corrélation entre les actes gratuits et les actes payants est indépendante des effets dus à la demande de soins. Outre la validité de l'hypothèse, les résultats obtenus fournissent des éléments de compréhension des motivations de médecins auxquelles la littérature en économie de la santé accorde désormais une grande attention.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeanne Lievaut & Philippe Batifoulier, 2011. "La transformation des actes gratuits en actes payants en médecine libérale. Une étude micro-économétrique longitudinale," Working Papers hal-04141002, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04141002
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04141002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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