Can external interventions crowd in intrinsic motivation? A cluster randomised field experiment on mandatory accreditation of general practice in Denmark
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DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2018.06.023
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- Syed Sohaib Zubair & Mukaram Ali Khan & Aamna Tariq Mukaram, 2021. "Public service motivation and organizational performance: Catalyzing effects of altruism, perceived social impact and political support," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(12), pages 1-20, December.
- Pedersen, Line Bjørnskov & Hvidt, Elisabeth Assing & Waldorff, Frans Boch & Andersen, Merethe Kousgaard, 2021. "Burnout of intrinsically motivated GPs when exposed to external regulation," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 125(4), pages 459-466.
- Anne Sophie Oxholm & Dorte Gyrd-Hansen & Christian Bøtcher Jacobsen & Ulrich Thy Jensen & Line Bjørnskov Pedersen, 2024. "The link between physician motivation and care," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 25(3), pages 525-537, April.
- Talia Goren & Itai Beeri & Dana R. Vashdi, 2023. "Framing policies to mobilize citizens' behavior during a crisis: Examining the effects of positive and negative vaccination incentivizing policies," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(2), pages 570-591, April.
- Pedersen, Line Bjørnskov & Allen, Thomas & Waldorff, Frans Boch & Andersen, Merethe Kirstine Kousgaard, 2020. "Does accreditation affect the job satisfaction of general practitioners? A combined panel data survey and cluster randomised field experiment," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 124(8), pages 849-855.
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