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Do Legal Standards Affect Ethical Concerns of Consumers?

Author

Listed:
  • Danz, David

    (University of Pittsburgh & WZB Berlin)

  • Engelmann, Dirk

    (HU Berlin)

  • Kübler, Dorothea

    (WZB Berlin & TU Berlin)

Abstract

To address the impact of regulation on ethical concerns of consumers, we study the example of minimum wages. In our experimental market, consumers have monopsony power, firms set prices and wages, and workers are passive recipients of a wage payment. We find that the majority of consumers occasionally deviate from their self-interest and that markets with such consumers exhibit substantially higher wages. Consumers implement fair allocations using two distinct strategies: they split their demand equally between firms, or they buy all units from the firm with the higher price and higher wage. The two strategies can be captured by maximin preferences and indirect reciprocity in Charness and Rabin’s (2002) reciprocal fairness model. Introducing a minimum wage in a market raises average wages despite its significant crowding out effects on consumers’ fairness concerns. Abolishing a minimum wage crowds in consumer fairness concerns, but crowding in is not sufficient to avoid overall negative effects on workers’ wages.

Suggested Citation

  • Danz, David & Engelmann, Dirk & Kübler, Dorothea, 2020. "Do Legal Standards Affect Ethical Concerns of Consumers?," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 234, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
  • Handle: RePEc:rco:dpaper:234
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    Cited by:

    1. Björn Bartling & Roberto A. Weber & Lan Yao, 2015. "Do Markets Erode Social Responsibility?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(1), pages 219-266.
    2. Hamilton, Stephen & Ouvrard, Benjamin, 2025. "Fair Pricing and Structural Excess Supply," 2025 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2025, Denver, CO 360647, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    3. Adena, Maja & Huck, Steffen, 2019. "Can mass fundraising harm your core business? A field experiment on how fundraising affects ticket sales," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2019-304, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Mario Biggeri & Domenico Colucci & Nicola Doni & Vincenzo Valori, 2021. "Good deeds, business, and social responsibility in a market experiment," Working Papers - Economics wp2021_14.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    5. Björn Bartling & Vanessa Valero & Roberto A. Weber & Lan Yao, 2024. "Public Discourse and Socially Responsible Market Behavior," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 114(10), pages 3041-3074, October.
    6. Bartling, Björn & Özdemir, Yagiz, 2023. "The limits to moral erosion in markets: Social norms and the replacement excuse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 143-160.
    7. Bauernschuster, Stefan & Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Jörg & Vadovic, Radovan, 2010. "Mandatory sick pay provision: A labor market experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 870-877, December.

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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