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Escaping TARP

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  • Wilson, Linus
  • Wu, Yan Wendy

Abstract

This paper studies the factors that were associated with a bank's early exit from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in 2009. Executive pay restrictions were often a rationale cited for early TARP exit, and high levels of CEO pay in 2008 were associated with banks being significantly more likely to escape TARP. In addition, we find that larger publicly traded banks with better accounting performance, the stronger capital ratios, and fewer troubled loans and other assets exited early. Banks that raised private capital in 2009 were significantly more likely to return the taxpayers’ money early. The original eight TARP recipients, which received $165 billion of the $245 billion passed out, had weak tangible common equity ratios at the end of 2008, relative to other TARP recipients. Those eight banks raised common equity capital in 2009, and all at least partially exited the government's embrace.

Suggested Citation

  • Wilson, Linus & Wu, Yan Wendy, 2012. "Escaping TARP," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 32-42.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finsta:v:8:y:2012:i:1:p:32-42
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2011.02.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Song, Wei-Ling & Uzmanoglu, Cihan, 2016. "TARP announcement, bank health, and borrowers’ credit risk," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 22-32.
    2. Fratianni, Michele & Marchionne, Francesco, 2013. "The fading stock market response to announcements of bank bailouts," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 69-89.
    3. Linus Wilson & Yan Wu & Stephanie Prejean, 2014. "Are the Bailouts of Wall Street Complements or Substitutes?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(1), pages 21-38, March.
    4. Berger, Allen N. & Makaew, Tanakorn & Roman, Raluca, 2015. "Did bank borrowers benefit from the TARP program : the effects of TARP on loan contract terms," Research Working Paper RWP 15-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    5. Kleymenova, Anya & Rose, Andrew K. & Wieladek, Tomasz, 2016. "Does government intervention affect banking globalization?," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 146-161.
    6. Chavaz, Matthieu & Rose, Andrew K, 2016. "Political Borders and Bank Lending in Post-Crisis America," CEPR Discussion Papers 11595, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Roman, Raluca & Berger, Allen N. & Sedunov, John, 2016. "Do bank bailouts reduce or increase systemic risk? the effects of TARP on financial system stability," Research Working Paper RWP 16-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    8. Liu, Wei & Kolari, James W. & Kyle Tippens, T. & Fraser, Donald R., 2013. "Did capital infusions enhance bank recovery from the great recession?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 5048-5061.
    9. Khan, Mozaffar & Vyas, Dushyantkumar, 2015. "The Capital Purchase Program and subsequent bank SEOs," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 91-105.
    10. Dumontaux, Nicolas & Pop, Adrian, 2013. "Understanding the market reaction to shockwaves: Evidence from the failure of Lehman Brothers," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 269-286.
    11. Daniel Ferreira & David Kershaw & Tom Kirchmaier & Edmund Schuster, "undated". "Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts," FMG Discussion Papers dp714, Financial Markets Group.
    12. Linus Wilson, 2013. "TARP’s deadbeat banks," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 41(4), pages 651-674, November.
    13. Black, Lamont K. & Hazelwood, Lieu N., 2013. "The effect of TARP on bank risk-taking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 790-803.
    14. Li, Lei, 2013. "TARP funds distribution and bank loan supply," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(12), pages 4777-4792.
    15. Berger, Allen N. & Roman, Raluca, 2015. "Did saving Wall Street really save Main Street : the real effects of TARP on local economic conditions," Research Working Paper RWP 15-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    16. Stefano Puddu & Andreas Waelchli, 2015. "TARP Effect on Bank Lending Behaviour: Evidence from the last Financial Crisis," IRENE Working Papers 15-06, IRENE Institute of Economic Research.
    17. William Bassett & Selva Demiralp & Nathan Lloyd, 2016. "Government Support of Banks and Bank Lending," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1611, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bailout; Banks; Banking; Basel capital standards; Callable bonds; Capital ratios; Capital Purchase Program (CPP); Dividends; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA); Hybrid securities; Investment; Preferred stock; Targeted Investment Program (TIP); Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP); U.S. Treasury; Warrants;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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