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The Carrot and the Stick: Bank Bailouts and the Disciplining Role of Board Appointments

Author

Listed:
  • Christian Mücke
  • Loriana Pelizzon
  • Vincenzo Pezone
  • Anjan Thakor

Abstract

We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks and its implications for regulatory policy. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP—the government's ability to appoint independent directors on the board of an assisted bank that missed six dividend payments to the Treasury—had a significant effect on bank behavior. Banks were averse to these appointments—the empirical distribution of missed payments exhibits a sharp discontinuity at five. Director appointments by the Treasury were associated with improved bank performance and lower CEO pay.

Suggested Citation

  • Christian Mücke & Loriana Pelizzon & Vincenzo Pezone & Anjan Thakor, 2024. "The Carrot and the Stick: Bank Bailouts and the Disciplining Role of Board Appointments," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 16(4), pages 415-462, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:16:y:2024:i:4:p:415-62
    DOI: 10.1257/pol.20230313
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    Cited by:

    1. Goetz, Martin R. & Laeven, Luc & Levine, Ross, 2025. "Do bank insiders impede equity issuances?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    2. Couaillier, Cyril & Reghezza, Alessio & Rodriguez d’Acri, Costanza & Scopelliti, Alessandro, 2025. "How to release capital requirements in an economic downturn? Evidence from euro area credit register," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    3. Hryckiewicz, Aneta & Kryg, Natalia & Tsomocos, Dimitrios P. & Zadorozhna, Olha, 2025. "Unveiling the power of state activism in times of distress," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 1346-1376.
    4. Berger, Allen N. & Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, 2021. "Banking research in the time of COVID-19," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    5. Allen N. Berger & Onesime Epouhe & Raluca Roman, 2021. "A Tale of Two Bailouts: Effects of TARP and PPP on Subprime Consumer Debt," Working Papers 21-32, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    6. Martynova, Natalya & Perotti, Enrico & Suarez, Javier, 2022. "Capital forbearance in the bank recovery and resolution game," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 884-904.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts

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