IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finana/v86y2023ics1057521923000601.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do shareholders really matter for firm performance? Evidence from the ownership characteristics of Italian listed companies

Author

Listed:
  • Caselli, Stefano
  • Gatti, Stefano
  • Chiarella, Carlo
  • Gigante, Gimede
  • Negri, Giulia

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of the features of the shareholder base on the performance of a large sample of Italian listed firms between 2007 and 2019, both within and across firms. We expand the empirical evidence on the relation between shareholder type and different dimensions of firm performance by dividing shareholders into six categories, and further differentiating between domestic and foreign investors. We provide extensive evidence on the relation between firm performance and different types of shareholders, showing how diverse performance metrics are correlated with the voting rights of specific types of shareholders. Consistent with previous studies, the picture that emerges from our analysis shows that the ownership structure of Italian listed companies is characterized by a high degree of concentration. In this context, we find that ownership concentration or the presence of a controlling shareholder is in general associated with better performance. Moreover, a positive relation exists between diverse firm performance metrics and the voting rights of family shareholders, founders and foreign investors, while government ownership is detrimental in the short-term.

Suggested Citation

  • Caselli, Stefano & Gatti, Stefano & Chiarella, Carlo & Gigante, Gimede & Negri, Giulia, 2023. "Do shareholders really matter for firm performance? Evidence from the ownership characteristics of Italian listed companies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:86:y:2023:i:c:s1057521923000601
    DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102544
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521923000601
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102544?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael E. Porter, 1992. "Capital Choices: Changing The Way America Invests In Industry," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 5(2), pages 4-16, June.
    2. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Agency Problems and Residual Claims," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 327-349, June.
    3. Claudio Michelacci & Olmo Silva, 2007. "Why So Many Local Entrepreneurs?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-633, November.
    4. Barclay, Michael J & Holderness, Clifford G, 1991. "Negotiated Block Trades and Corporate Control," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(3), pages 861-878, July.
    5. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. "Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 31-48, March.
    6. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    7. Alon Brav & Hyunseob Kim & Wei Jiang, 2015. "Recent Advances in Research on Hedge Fund Activism: Value Creation and Identification," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 579-595, December.
    8. Gur Aminadav & Elias Papaioannou, 2020. "Corporate Control around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(3), pages 1191-1246, June.
    9. Thomsen, Steen & Pedersen, Torben & Kvist, Hans Kurt, 2006. "Blockholder ownership: Effects on firm value in market and control based governance systems," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 246-269, January.
    10. Alex Edmans, 2009. "Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(6), pages 2481-2513, December.
    11. Gaspar, Jose-Miguel & Massa, Massimo & Matos, Pedro, 2005. "Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 135-165, April.
    12. Breugem, Matthijs & Corvino, Raffaele, 2021. "Dynamic ownership and private benefits," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    13. Faccio, Mara & McConnell, John J. & Stolin, David, 2006. "Returns to Acquirers of Listed and Unlisted Targets," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 197-220, March.
    14. Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, 2004. "Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(2), pages 537-600, April.
    15. Lang, Larry & Poulsen, Annette & Stulz, Rene, 1995. "Asset sales, firm performance, and the agency costs of managerial discretion," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 3-37, January.
    16. Bernile, Gennaro & Bhagwat, Vineet & Yonker, Scott, 2018. "Board diversity, firm risk, and corporate policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(3), pages 588-612.
    17. Isakov, Dušan & Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe, 2014. "Are founding families special blockholders? An investigation of controlling shareholder influence on firm performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-16.
    18. Dasgupta, Amil & Fos, Vyacheslav & Sautner, Zacharias, 2021. "Institutional investors and corporate governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    19. JOSEPH A. McCAHERY & ZACHARIAS SAUTNER & LAURA T. STARKS, 2016. "Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(6), pages 2905-2932, December.
    20. Denis, David J, 1990. "Defensive Changes in Corporate Payout Policy: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1433-1456, December.
    21. Jean‐Luc Arregle & Michael A. Hitt & David G. Sirmon & Philippe Very, 2007. "The Development of Organizational Social Capital: Attributes of Family Firms," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 73-95, January.
    22. Crane, Alan D. & Koch, Andrew & Michenaud, Sébastien, 2019. "Institutional investor cliques and governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 175-197.
    23. Xavier Gabaix, 2009. "Power Laws in Economics and Finance," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 255-294, May.
    24. Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Power Laws in Economics: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(1), pages 185-206, Winter.
    25. Joon Mahn Lee & Jung Chul Park & Timothy B. Folta, 2018. "CEO career horizon, corporate governance, and real options: The role of economic short‐termism," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(10), pages 2703-2725, October.
    26. Renée B. Adams & Heitor Almeida & Daniel Ferreira, 2005. "Powerful CEOs and Their Impact on Corporate Performance," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(4), pages 1403-1432.
    27. Alon Brav & Wei Jiang & Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, 2008. "Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1729-1775, August.
    28. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-1177, December.
    29. Jean-Luc Arrègle & Michael Hitt & David Sirmon & Philippe Véry, 2007. "The Development of Organizational Social Capital : Attributes of Family Firms," Post-Print hal-02312687, HAL.
    30. Saul Estrin & Jan Hanousek & Evzen Kocenda & Jan Svejnar, 2009. "The Effects of Privatization and Ownership in Transition Economies," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(3), pages 699-728, September.
    31. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐de‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2000. "Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(1), pages 1-33, February.
    32. Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, 2009. "The "Wall Street Walk" and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(7), pages 2445-2485, July.
    33. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance and Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 107-156.
    34. Perotti, Enrico C, 1995. "Credible Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 847-859, September.
    35. Megginson, William Leon, 2005. "The Financial Economics of Privatization," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195150629.
    36. Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen & Francisco Perez-Gonzalez & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2007. "Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(2), pages 647-691.
    37. Jeffry M. Netter & William L. Megginson, 2001. "From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 321-389, June.
    38. Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, 2005. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1005-1030, September.
    39. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1996. "A Theory of Privatisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 309-319, March.
    40. Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 2015. "A five-factor asset pricing model," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 1-22.
    41. Alexander Aganin & Paolo Volpin, 2005. "The History of Corporate Ownership in Italy," NBER Chapters, in: A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family Business Groups to Professional Managers, pages 325-366, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    42. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September.
    43. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1985. "Raiders or saviors? The evidence on six controversial investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 555-555, December.
    44. Alex Edmans & Gustavo Manso, 2011. "Governance Through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(7), pages 2395-2428.
    45. Gao, Huasheng & Harford, Jarrad & Li, Kai, 2017. "CEO Turnover–Performance Sensitivity in Private Firms," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 583-611, April.
    46. Audinga Baltrunaite & Elisa Brodi & Sauro Mocetti, 2019. "Ownership structure and governance of the Italian firms: new evidence and effects on firm performance," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 514, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    47. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    48. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1327, June.
    49. Duchin, Ran & Matsusaka, John G. & Ozbas, Oguzhan, 2010. "When are outside directors effective?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 195-214, May.
    50. Fama, Eugene F & MacBeth, James D, 1973. "Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 607-636, May-June.
    51. Ryan Federo & Yuliya Ponomareva & Ruth V. Aguilera & Angel Saz‐Carranza & Carlos Losada, 2020. "Bringing owners back on board: A review of the role of ownership type in board governance," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(6), pages 348-371, November.
    52. Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
    53. Nickolay Gantchev & Chotibhak Jotikasthira, 2018. "Institutional Trading and Hedge Fund Activism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 2930-2950, June.
    54. John Asker & Joan Farre-Mensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, 2015. "Corporate Investment and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(2), pages 342-390.
    55. Miller, Danny & Le Breton-Miller, Isabelle & Lester, Richard H. & Cannella Jr., Albert A., 2007. "Are family firms really superior performers?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 829-858, December.
    56. Richard A. Johnson & Karen Schnatterly & Scott G. Johnson & Shih‐Chi Chiu, 2010. "Institutional Investors and Institutional Environment: A Comparative Analysis and Review," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(8), pages 1590-1613, December.
    57. Aggarwal, Reena & Erel, Isil & Ferreira, Miguel & Matos, Pedro, 2011. "Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 154-181, April.
    58. Himmelberg, Charles P. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1999. "Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-384, September.
    59. Cvijanović, Dragana & Dasgupta, Amil & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2022. "The Wall Street stampede: Exit as governance with interacting blockholders," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 433-455.
    60. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen & Scott Hirst, 2017. "The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 89-102, Summer.
    61. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
    62. Karen Schnatterly & Scott G. Johnson, 2014. "Independent boards and the institutional investors that prefer them: Drivers of institutional investor heterogeneity in governance preferences," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(10), pages 1552-1563, October.
    63. Julian Franks & Colin Mayer & Paolo Volpin & Hannes F. Wagner, 2012. "The Life Cycle of Family Ownership: International Evidence," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(6), pages 1675-1712.
    64. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-488, June.
    65. April Klein & Emanuel Zur, 2009. "Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 187-229, February.
    66. Linck, James S. & Netter, Jeffry M. & Yang, Tina, 2008. "The determinants of board structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 308-328, February.
    67. Boubakri, Narjess & Cosset, Jean-Claude & Saffar, Walid, 2013. "The role of state and foreign owners in corporate risk-taking: Evidence from privatization," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 641-658.
    68. Bena, Jan & Ferreira, Miguel A & Matos, Pedro & Pires, Pedro, 2017. "Are foreign investors locusts? The long-term effects of foreign institutional ownership," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 122-146.
    69. Carhart, Mark M, 1997. "On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(1), pages 57-82, March.
    70. Short, Helen, 1994. "Ownership, Control, Financial Structure and the Performance of Firms," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 203-249, September.
    71. Jean Tirole, 2006. "The Theory of Corporate Finance," Post-Print hal-00173191, HAL.
    72. Harford, Jarrad & Kecskés, Ambrus & Mansi, Sattar, 2018. "Do long-term investors improve corporate decision making?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 424-452.
    73. Roberto Barontini & Lorenzo Caprio, 2006. "The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 12(5), pages 689-723, November.
    74. Amil Dasgupta & Vyacheslav Fos & Zacharias Sautner, 2021. "Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 12(4), pages 276-394, September.
    75. Andres, Christian, 2008. "Large shareholders and firm performance--An empirical examination of founding-family ownership," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 431-445, September.
    76. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, 2015. "The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism," NBER Working Papers 21227, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    77. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    78. Jennifer E. Bethel & Julia Porter Liebeskind & Tim Opler, 1998. "Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 605-634, April.
    79. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, 2019. "Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy," NBER Working Papers 26543, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    80. Rajan, Raghuram G. & Zingales, Luigi, 2003. "The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 5-50, July.
    81. Saeyoung Chang, 1998. "Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payment, and Bidder Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(2), pages 773-784, April.
    82. José-Miguel Gaspar & Massimo Massa & Pedro Matos & Rajdeep Patgiri & Zahid Rehman, 2013. "Payout Policy Choices and Shareholder Investment Horizons," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(1), pages 261-320.
    83. Jeffrey W. Allen & John J. McConnell, 1998. "Equity Carve-Outs and Managerial Discretion," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 163-186, February.
    84. Jarrad Harford, 1999. "Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 1969-1997, December.
    85. Chen, Xia & Harford, Jarrad & Li, Kai, 2007. "Monitoring: Which institutions matter?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 279-305, November.
    86. Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, 2006. "The Role of Family in Family Firms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 73-96, Spring.
    87. Shuping Li, 2018. "Increased non‐family ownership in family‐owned firms: How does it affect CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(13), pages 3434-3457, December.
    88. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    89. Maury, Benjamin, 2006. "Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western European corporations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 321-341, January.
    90. Ho, Joanna & Huang, Cheng Jen & Karuna, Christo, 2020. "Large shareholder ownership types and board governance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    91. Kathleen Fuller & Jeffry Netter & Mike Stegemoller, 2002. "What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(4), pages 1763-1793, August.
    92. Brennan, Michael J. & Chordia, Tarun & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1998. "Alternative factor specifications, security characteristics, and the cross-section of expected stock returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 345-373, September.
    93. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1328, June.
    94. Holderness, Clifford G., 2016. "Law and Ownership Reexamined," Critical Finance Review, now publishers, vol. 5(1), pages 41-83, May.
    95. Richard A. Johnson & Karen Schnatterly & Scott G. Johnson & Shih-Chi Chiu, 2010. "Institutional Investors and Institutional Environment: A Comparative Analysis and Review," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(s2), pages 1590-1613, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ramona Rupeika-Apoga & Stefan Wendt & Victoria Geyfman, 2024. "Shareholders in the Driver’s Seat: Unraveling the Impact on Financial Performance in Latvian Fintech Companies," Risks, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-16, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Harford, Jarrad & Kecskés, Ambrus & Mansi, Sattar, 2018. "Do long-term investors improve corporate decision making?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 424-452.
    2. Edmans, Alex & Holderness, Clifford, 2016. "Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Dasgupta, Amil & Fos, Vyacheslav & Sautner, Zacharias, 2021. "Institutional investors and corporate governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112114, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Christian Engelen, 2015. "The effects of managerial discretion on moral hazard related behaviour: German evidence on agency costs," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(4), pages 927-960, November.
    5. Bouzgarrou, Houssam & Navatte, Patrick, 2013. "Ownership structure and acquirers performance: Family vs. non-family firms," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 123-134.
    6. Isakov, Dušan & Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe, 2014. "Are founding families special blockholders? An investigation of controlling shareholder influence on firm performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-16.
    7. Hegde, Shantaram & Seth, Rama & Vishwanatha, S.R., 2020. "Ownership concentration and stock returns: Evidence from family firms in India," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    8. Agarwal, Anushka & Chaudhry, Neeru, 2022. "Foreign controlling shareholders and corporate investment," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    9. Breuer, Wolfgang & Knetsch, Andreas, 2022. "Informal authority and economic outcomes of family firms: An issue of national power distance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    10. Andres, Christian, 2008. "Large shareholders and firm performance--An empirical examination of founding-family ownership," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 431-445, September.
    11. Hamadi, Malika & Heinen, Andréas, 2015. "Firm performance when ownership is very concentrated: Evidence from a semiparametric panel," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 172-194.
    12. Naeem Tabassum & Satwinder Singh, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-48527-6, September.
    13. Schmidt, Cornelius & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2017. "Do exogenous changes in passive institutional ownership affect corporate governance and firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 285-306.
    14. Weiß, Christian, 2010. "The Ownership Concentration of Firms: Three Essays on the Determinants and Effects," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 30247, July.
    15. Chang, Eric C. & Lin, Tse-Chun & Ma, Xiaorong, 2020. "Governance through trading on acquisitions of public firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    16. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5922 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Nguyen, Nghia Huu & Shiu, Cheng-Yi, 2022. "Stewardship, institutional investors monitoring, and firm value: Evidence from the United Kingdom," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    18. Helwege, Jean & Intintoli, Vincent J. & Zhang, Andrew, 2012. "Voting with their feet or activism? Institutional investors’ impact on CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 22-37.
    19. Andy Lardon & Christof Beuselinck & Marc Deloof, 2019. "Does stable ownership create value? Evidence from the global financial crisis," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 573-642, February.
    20. Sylvain Marsat & Yves Mard & Fabien Roux, 2014. "Ownership structure and corporate financial performance: evidence from France [Structure de l’actionnariat et performance financière de l’entreprise : le cas français]," Post-Print hal-02156607, HAL.
    21. Christian Weiss & Stefan Hilger, 2012. "Ownership concentration beyond good and evil: is there an effect on corporate performance?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(4), pages 727-752, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Firm performance; Corporate governance; Shareholder characteristics; Italian listed companies; Family-controlled ownership; Foreigner ownership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finana:v:86:y:2023:i:c:s1057521923000601. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620166 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.