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Land reform and agrarian socialism in interwar Europe: Evidence from 1930s Spain before civil war

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  • Domènech, Jordi
  • Lahdelma, Ilona
  • Martinelli, Pablo

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of various types of land reform on the voting of the rural poor in a developing, largely agrarian economy such as 1930s Spain. Using municipal-level electoral results in a region with intense but heterogeneous land-related interventions, we find that permanent transfers of land had the greatest positive impact on voting for leftist candidates, followed by temporary transfers of land aimed at alleviating the problem of seasonal unemployment. Poorly planned temporary transfers of land without adequate funding for beneficiaries made the landless more vulnerable to landowner control and had the opposite result. Our results show that the secret ballot might be insufficient to guarantee the free vote of economically dependent landless laborers. They also show that land reforms with poor support for beneficiaries might backfire.

Suggested Citation

  • Domènech, Jordi & Lahdelma, Ilona & Martinelli, Pablo, 2024. "Land reform and agrarian socialism in interwar Europe: Evidence from 1930s Spain before civil war," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:94:y:2024:i:c:s0014498324000445
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eeh.2024.101618
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N54 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: 1913-
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • Q10 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - General
    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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