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Self-rewards and personal motivation

Listed author(s):
  • Koch, Alexander K.
  • Nafziger, Julia
  • Suvorov, Anton
  • van de Ven, Jeroen

Self-administered rewards are ubiquitous. They serve as incentives for personal accomplishments and are widely recommended to increase personal motivation. We show that in a model with time-inconsistent and reference-dependent preferences, self-rewards can be a credible and effective tool to overcome self-control problems. We also discuss the different types of self-rewards the individual can use, such as vice goods and virtue goods, and analyze which types of goods the individual prefers.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292114000439
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 68 (2014)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 151-167

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:68:y:2014:i:c:p:151-167
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.03.002
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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