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Failure of communication despite close preferences

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  • Spector, David

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  • Spector, David, 2002. "Failure of communication despite close preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 283-289, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:74:y:2002:i:3:p:283-289
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
    2. Spector, David, 2000. "Pure communication between agents with close preferences," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 171-178, February.
    3. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Bartels & Denzil Fiebig & Arthur Soest, 2006. "Consumers and experts: an econometric analysis of the demand for water heaters," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 369-391, June.

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