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A model of self-regulation

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  • Nunez, Javier

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  • Nunez, Javier, 2001. "A model of self-regulation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 91-97, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:74:y:2001:i:1:p:91-97
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    1. Gehrig, Thomas & Jost, Peter-J, 1995. "Quacks, Lemons, and Self Regulation: A Welfare Analysis," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 309-325, May.
    2. Winand Emons, 1997. "Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 107-119, Spring.
    3. Carl Shapiro, 1982. "Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 20-35, Spring.
    4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    5. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Arce M. & L. Gunn, 2005. "Working Well with Others: The Evolution of Teamwork and Ethics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 115-131, April.
    2. Katarina Svitkova & Andreas Ortmann, 2006. "Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism: Theory and Suggestive Evidence," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp288, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    3. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2011. "Reputation on a credence good market: an economic analysis of professional self-regulation," EconomiX Working Papers 2011-32, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    4. Kolesnik, Georgiy, 2015. "Modelling "race to the bottom" effect on the self-regulated markets," MPRA Paper 64138, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2015. "Self-regulation of the legal profession and quality in the market for legal services: an economic analysis of lawyers’ reputation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 431-449, April.
    6. Heeks, Richard & Duncombe, Richard, 2003. "Ethical Trade: Issues in the Regulation of Global Supply Chains," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30674, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    7. Simon Ashby & Swee-Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann, 2004. "Industry Self-Regulation: A Game-Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 91-106.
    8. Bendikov, Mikhail & Kolesnik, Georgiy, 2013. "Конкуренция Саморегулируемых Организаций И Эффективность Рынков [Self-regulatory organizations competition and the market efficiency]," MPRA Paper 47812, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Camille Chaserant & Sophie Harnay, 2010. "Déréglementer la profession d’avocat ? Les apories de l’analyse économique," Working Papers hal-04140922, HAL.
    10. Grajzl, Peter & Murrell, Peter, 2007. "Allocating lawmaking powers: Self-regulation vs government regulation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 520-545, September.
    11. Javier Núñez, 2007. "Can self regulation work?: a story of corruption, impunity and cover-up," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 209-233, April.
    12. Silvester Van Koten & Andreas Ortmann, 2016. "Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments in Organizational Economics, volume 19, pages 85-104, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    13. Heyes, Anthony G., 2005. "A signaling motive for self-regulation in the shadow of coercion," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 238-246.
    14. Garcia Martinez, Marian & Poole, Nigel, 2004. "The development of private fresh produce safety standards: implications for developing Mediterranean exporting countries," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 229-255, June.
    15. Javier Nuñez & Jose Luis Lima, 2005. "Incentivos Reputacionales para la Autorregulación: Un Análisis Experimental," Working Papers wp216, University of Chile, Department of Economics.
    16. Andreas Ortmann & Katarína Svítková, 2007. "Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism in Transition Economies: Evidence, Theory, and Open Questions," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2007(2), pages 99-114.
    17. Grajzl, Peter & Baniak, Andrzej, 2009. "Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 360-374, December.
    18. Marian Garcia Martinez & Nigel Poole & Claire Skinner & Csaba Illes & József Lehota, 2006. "Food safety performance in European union accession countries: Benchmarking the fresh produce import sector in Hungary," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(1), pages 69-89.
    19. Evelyn Vezza, 2004. "Poder de Mercado en las Profesiones Autorreguladas: El Desempeño Médico en Argentina," CEDLAS, Working Papers 0016, CEDLAS, Universidad Nacional de La Plata.

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